2011/7/11 <[email protected]> > Yes, by sequentially eliminating one member of the remaining largest > diameter pair, the method elects a > centrist. > > If this is considered a problem, it can be overcome by sequentially > eliminating one member of the > current smallest diameter pair. However, this variant introduces a strong > incentive for compromise, > which is nil in the other version. >
The point which Badinski and Laraki advocate is that neither all-centrists nor all-extremists is good. I think that this second proposal is at least as subject to center-squeeze as IRV, if not more, so like IRV it would class as "too extremist" by their reckoning. JQ > > ----- Original Message ----- > From: Jameson Quinn > > This system seems explicitly designed to elect a centrist. In their > > experimental > > paperonMajority Judgment, system inventors Badinski and Laraki run a > > simulation > > to see how often different systems elect a centrist. Most > > systems they test > > either elect the centrist almost always (ie, condorcet systems) > > or almost > > never (plurality, IRV, runoffs), but their MJ system does about > > half the > > time. They argue that this "lack of bias" either towards or away from > > centrists is best, because a system which is too skewed to the > > middle or to > > the extremes will distort the political dialogue in > > corresponding ways. > > Though I think their simulation is just a rudimentary first > > step, I find > > their normative argument convincing; and so I don't really like this > > "distance" method. > > > > JQ > > > > 2011/7/10 > > > > > First find a clone consistent way of defining distance between > > candidates.> > > > Then while two or more candidates remain > > > of the two with the greatest distance from each other > > > eliminate the one with the greatest pairwise defeat > > > EndWhile. > > > > > > Various variants are possble. For example, you could count > > defeats only > > > from the remaining > > > candidates. Also there are various possible measures of > > defeat strength. > > > In that regard, if you say that > > > any defeat by covering is stronger than every non-covering > > defeat, then the > > > method will always elect a > > > covered candidate. > > > > > > To get a distance estimate in a large election you could just > > ask each > > > voter to list the pair of candidates > > > that seem the most different on the issue or combination of > > issues of most > > > concern (to that voter). The > > > pair submitted by the greatest number of voters would be the > > first pair > > > considered, etc. > > > > > > What potential for manipulation does this direct approach introduce? > > > > > > Perhaps voters would try to pit their favorites' rivals > > against each other. > > > Would that be insincere? Not if > > > they consider their favorite to have a reasonable middle of > > the road > > > position, while viewing the rivals as > > > being at opposite unreasonable extremes. > > > > > > What indirect measure of distance could be used? > > > > > > If we count the number of ballots on which candidates X and Y > > are ranked at > > > opposite extremes (top > > > rank for one versus unranked for the other), the monotonicity > > of the method > > > would probably be > > > destroyed. Is there a more subtle way of inferring the > > distance that > > > wouldn't destroy the monotonicity? > > > > > > ---- > > > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em > > for list info > > > > > >
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