Hi Forest, --- En date de : Ven 15.7.11, [email protected] <[email protected]> a écrit : > > I think I will try implementing the "eliminate the > pairwise > > loser of > > the most distant pair" method. I am curious how well > it would > > discourageburial. I wonder also how often it would > fail Plurality... > > Kevin, the method fails Plurality, and is vulnerable > to burying. Its strong point should be with regards to > compromising.
I did one test (1D spectrum) with a (too) small number of trials and it seemed good there. It was a lot like WV, but a bit better across the board. I do wish we could get the compression incentive down. (Incidentally, this seems to be an advantage of the MinMax method where you count the number of voters who would actually have been able to avert a cycle. That is, you have to actually vote C>B>A in order to "complain" when B>A gets overridden. And you are not counted as a voice for respecting the C>B contest, because you have no way to threaten to change your ballot should C>B be overturned.) It occurred to me that a very "distant" pair of candidates are, in practice, often going to be the frontrunners, registering as "distant" because voters don't want to vote for them both. In that case we are probably cutting out the "wrong" one early in the process. But after that point we get the Plurality failures, as nothing stops the "right" frontrunner from being cut down by a noise candidate not generally viable. I was trying to think of how we could just stop after one comparison. I tried a few versions of something like the following: Find the pair of Schwartz candidates, if there is more than one (i.e. let's not fail Majority Favorite), with the greatest "approval distance," which is basically the sum of the "approval opposition" in each direction. Just elect the winner of that contest. (Break ties probably by approval of the pairwise winner.) I think the non-monotonicity of "approval distance" wouldn't be a huge practical problem. I might be wrong but it seems like an unintuitive strategy to remove the approval distinction between your candidate and the frontrunner who beats him pairwise. Even if you do it I wonder in how many situations you would have reason to expect it to work? Unfortunately, so far my methods (SCAD - "Single Contest Approval Distance") don't seem to be very good. Kevin Venzke ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
