Hi Forest, --- En date de : Sam 16.7.11, [email protected] <[email protected]> a écrit : > Kevin, > > Do we agree that working from closest pairs outward solves > the Plurality problem (at the expense of > compromise and less monotonicity)?
Not sure. My sim often doesn't find any Plurality failures even when they are possible, because the behavior of the voters may never produce them. (And my sim doesn't identify monotonicity failures at all.) I never found Plurality failures with "furthest in" and only did one test with "closest out." Looking back, unfortunately I used rather odd parameters for the test. If the test can be trusted, it said that "closest out" had higher compromise, much less compression, much more truncation, slightly higher burial, and zero (i.e. slightly less) pushover. Sincere Condorcet efficiency was slightly better. Utility maximizer efficiency was a bit worse. I don't think I would trust this at all, except for the basic point that in general the methods will look different. But you did guess, above, that compromise would be higher, and I did see that, so maybe there's something there. I'm interested to think about your more recent posts but don't have time at the moment. I did stumble upon a seemingly very nice "Single Contest" method. I tested maybe ten versions. I will explain it later, if I sell myself on it... Specifically: If I move all the method's strategy to approval cutoff placement, so that none of the strategy counts as an insincere type, is that actually as good of a thing as it looks on paper? If not, then maybe I'm not measuring what I want to be... I cut out Schwartz and it helped a lot. Schwartz is kind of against the principle I'm after anyway: It inherently has this possibility of creating a defeat against one candidate in order to take advantage of the status of a completely different defeat. Kevin Venzke ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
