Perhaps I should start by asking you to explain amalgamation. I have an idea of what you mean, but you didn't explain it in the initial post of this thread, and I don't want to write a detailed analysis based on a possibly-wrong supposition.
JQ 2011/7/31 <[email protected]> > Jameson, > > for my benefit could you elaborate on what you mean by hijacking strategy, > especially in the context of > amalgamation of factions. > > Is ordinary Range susceptible to hijacking? If not, then neither is > amalgamation of factions per se, since > Range scores are identical with or without amalgamation of factions. > > Forest > > ----- Original Message ----- > From: Jameson Quinn > Date: Saturday, July 30, 2011 4:35 pm > Subject: Re: [EM] A DSV method inspired by SODA > To: [email protected] > Cc: [email protected] > > > 2011/7/30 > > > > > One of the features of SODA is a step where the candidates > > decide what > > > their approval cutoffs will be.on > > > behalf of themselves and the voters for whom they are acting > > as proxies. > > > One of the many novel features > > > is that instead of making these decisions simultaneously, the > > candidates> make them sequentially with > > > full knowledge of the decisions of the candidates preceding > > them in the > > > sequence. > > > > > > I wonder if anybody has ever tried a DSV (designated strategy > > voting)> method based on these ideas. > > > > > > Here's one way it could go: > > > > > > Voters submit range ballots. > > > > > > Factions are amalgamated via weighted averages, so that each > > candidate ends > > > up with one faction that > > > counts according to its total weight. For large electorates, > > these faction > > > scores will almost surely yield > > > complete rankings of the candidates. > > > > > > From this point on, only these rankings will be used. The > > ratings were > > > only needed for the purpose of > > > amalgamating the factions. If we had started with rankings, > > we could have > > > converted them to ratings via > > > the method of my recent post under the subject "Borda Done > > Right." In > > > either case, once we have the > > > rankings from the amalgamated factions we proceed as follows: > > > > > > Based on these rankings the DSC (descending solid coalitions) > > winner D is > > > found. The D faction ranking > > > determines the sequential order of play. When it is candidate > > X's turn in > > > the order of play, X's approval > > > cutoff decision is made automatically as follows: > > > > > > For each of the possible cutoffs, the winner is determined > > recursively (by > > > running through the rest of the > > > DSV tentatively). The cutoff that yields the best (i.e. > > highest ranked) > > > candidate according to X's faction's > > > ranking, is the cutoff that is applied to X's faction. > > > > > > After all of the cutoffs have been applied, the approval > > winner (based on > > > those cutoffs) is elected. > > > > > > It would be too good to be true if this method turned out to > > be monotone. > > > For that to be true moving up > > > one position in the sequence of play could not hurt the > > winner. Although I > > > think that this is probably > > > usually true, I don't think that it is always true. Anybody > > know any > > > different? > > > > > > > > > I'm pretty certain that even if a method like this could be > > monotone, the > > amalgamation in the first step breaks it, because of a > > "candidate hijacking" > > strategy. > > > > I have no opinion if some other way to do this step would give > > monotonicity.I'd like to think so, but I wouldn't bet on it. > > > > JQ > > > > > ---- > > > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em > > for list info > > > > > >
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