I was also looking for pure proportional representation. The compromise decisions would take place after the election in a representative body or in a government. The election methods need not be tampered. My theory was just that in the case that the majority (of parties) that forms the government is considerably larger than 51% the decisions could have wider support than in the typical 51+% governments of a two-party system. The larger government would have to make compromises that are at least acceptable to all parties in the government.
Juho On 6.8.2011, at 17.39, James Gilmour wrote: >> Juho Laatu > Sent: Thursday, August 04, 2011 5:12 PM >>> On 4.8.2011, at 14.21, James Gilmour wrote: >>> There is only one real issue in elections: representation of the >>> voters. >>> >>> If in a single winner partisan election the voters vote 51% for A and >>> 49% for B, we have a major problem in representation. >> >> Ok, 49% of the voters without representation. > > This throws the problem into its sharpest perspective. There are related, > difficult problems when there are three, four or more > candidates for the one seat. > > >> If one uses single-member districts to elect multiple >> representatives, then this means also some randomness in the >> results. This is not really a problem of single-winner >> methods themselves but a problem in how they are used (as >> multi-winner methods). > > I agree. It is fundamentally wrong to use any single-winner, single-member > district voting system to elect the members of a > "representative assembly" (e.g. city council, state legislature). > > >>> But if the voters vote in the same way (51% to 49%) in a two-member >>> election, any sensible voting system will give one seat to A and one >>> seat to B. >>> >>> Compared to that difference in providing "representation of the >>> voters", all the other differences between single-winner and >>> multi-winner elections are trivial. >> >> From this point of view single-winner methods are more >> "problematic" than multi-winner methods (at least when used >> to elect multiple representatives from single-member >> districts). > > No - not just when (improperly) used to elect the members of a > "representative assembly". THE problem is inherent in the > single-winner election. As you go on to say in your next comment. > >> This problem of single-winner methods is quite >> impossible to fix (most single-winner methods respect the >> will of the majority). > > The extreme problem (51% to 49%) is impossible to fix and so it is the > greatest challenge in electoral science to obtain the "most > representative" outcome. In the two-candidate election, the best we can do > is to guarantee representation to the majority. > > >> The 51% vs. 49% problem is present also in accurately >> proportional representative bodies since also those bodies >> may make majority decisions. One way to alleviate this kind >> of narrow majority related problems is to seek compromise >> decisions. > > I have to part company with you here. It should NOT, in my view, be part of > the function of the voting system to manipulate the > votes to obtain any outcome other than "representation of the voters". It is > not part of the function of a voting system to "seek > consensus". > > If the voters want to vote for candidates who will seek consensus, that's > fine - but that is very different for making "seek > consensus" an objective of the voting system. > > The function of the voting system should simply be to return the "most > representative" result in terms of representing the voters, > as expressed by the voters' responses to the candidates who have offered > themselves for election. > > "Seeking consensus" and "not seeking consensus" are aspects of how the > elected members will behave within the elected assembly. And > of course, the voters may rightly take such views into account in their > assessments of the candidates before they cast their votes. > But that is just part of candidate appraisal. Given a sensitive voting > system, the outcome (seats won) will reflect the views of > the voters, which may include views on "seeking consensus". > > James > > >> That is what in principle happens e.g. in >> coalition governments. Coalition governments may represent >> well over 50% of the voters. Let's assume that this is the >> case. The program of the government may contain multiple >> topics that would be 51% vs. 49% questions in the >> representative body or among the voters, but probably all >> coalition members will get more than they lose. Let's assume >> that the coalition is heterogeneous so that it does not agree >> on all the 51% vs. 49% decisions that is has to make. Maybe >> there are two 51% vs. 49% topics that go the right way >> against every one such topic that goes wrong. In that way we >> don't have a narrow majority that always makes 51% decisions >> but a supermajority that has considerably higher support behind >> everything it does (although all parties of the coalition >> do not like all the decisions). >> >> In two-party systems the balance is based more on two >> alternating policies. Often both parties have quite centrist >> policies since both try to meet the needs of the median >> voters. In some topics they may however have also clearly >> opposite positions. I guess the overall policy and results of >> two-party system governments are typically more 51% majority >> driven than in multi-party governments. (Coalition >> governments may however also have only narrow majority and >> the coalitions may be quite fixed, e.g. left vs. right, and >> as a result their decisions may follow the 51% majority style.) >> >> My point is just that in addition to multi-winner methods and >> proper PR one may need "the art of compromise decisions" to >> get rid of the strongest 51% vs. 49% . This discussion went >> already quite far from the technical properties of the >> single-winner methods, but maybe this kind of compromise >> making related problems can be considered to be one key >> problem that the different methods and their use in societies >> should try to address (if the case that one wants to replace >> "the dictatorship of narrow majority" with "horse trading >> deals of larger majorities"). >> >> Juho > ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
