You can also have minority government (usually single-party), where the majorities are by consensus, issue by issue, transcending the parties.
Incidentally, what is "pure proportional representation"? It is a term I have come across quite frequently. James > -----Original Message----- > From: election-methods-boun...@lists.electorama.com > [mailto:election-methods-boun...@lists.electorama.com] On > Behalf Of Juho Laatu > Sent: Saturday, August 06, 2011 5:38 PM > To: EM list > Subject: Re: [EM] Record activity on the EM list? > > > I was also looking for pure proportional representation. The > compromise decisions would take place after the election in a > representative body or in a government. The election methods > need not be tampered. My theory was just that in the case > that the majority (of parties) that forms the government is > considerably larger than 51% the decisions could have wider > support than in the typical 51+% governments of a two-party > system. The larger government would have to make compromises > that are at least acceptable to all parties in the government. > > Juho > > > On 6.8.2011, at 17.39, James Gilmour wrote: > > >> Juho Laatu > Sent: Thursday, August 04, 2011 5:12 PM > >>> On 4.8.2011, at 14.21, James Gilmour wrote: > >>> There is only one real issue in elections: representation of the > >>> voters. > >>> > >>> If in a single winner partisan election the voters vote 51% for A > >>> and > >>> 49% for B, we have a major problem in representation. > >> > >> Ok, 49% of the voters without representation. > > > > This throws the problem into its sharpest perspective. There are > > related, difficult problems when there are three, four or more > > candidates for the one seat. > > > > > >> If one uses single-member districts to elect multiple > >> representatives, then this means also some randomness in the > >> results. This is not really a problem of single-winner > >> methods themselves but a problem in how they are used (as > >> multi-winner methods). > > > > I agree. It is fundamentally wrong to use any single-winner, > > single-member district voting system to elect the members of a > > "representative assembly" (e.g. city council, state legislature). > > > > > >>> But if the voters vote in the same way (51% to 49%) in a > two-member > >>> election, any sensible voting system will give one seat > to A and one > >>> seat to B. > >>> > >>> Compared to that difference in providing "representation of the > >>> voters", all the other differences between single-winner and > >>> multi-winner elections are trivial. > >> > >> From this point of view single-winner methods are more > >> "problematic" than multi-winner methods (at least when used > >> to elect multiple representatives from single-member > >> districts). > > > > No - not just when (improperly) used to elect the members > of a "representative assembly". THE problem is inherent in the > > single-winner election. As you go on to say in your next comment. > > > >> This problem of single-winner methods is quite > >> impossible to fix (most single-winner methods respect the > >> will of the majority). > > > > The extreme problem (51% to 49%) is impossible to fix and > so it is the > > greatest challenge in electoral science to obtain the "most > > representative" outcome. In the two-candidate election, > the best we > > can do is to guarantee representation to the majority. > > > > > >> The 51% vs. 49% problem is present also in accurately > >> proportional representative bodies since also those bodies > >> may make majority decisions. One way to alleviate this kind > >> of narrow majority related problems is to seek compromise > >> decisions. > > > > I have to part company with you here. It should NOT, in my > view, be > > part of the function of the voting system to manipulate the > votes to > > obtain any outcome other than "representation of the > voters". It is > > not part of the function of a voting system to "seek consensus". > > > > If the voters want to vote for candidates who will seek consensus, > > that's fine - but that is very different for making "seek > consensus" > > an objective of the voting system. > > > > The function of the voting system should simply be to > return the "most > > representative" result in terms of representing the voters, as > > expressed by the voters' responses to the candidates who > have offered > > themselves for election. > > > > "Seeking consensus" and "not seeking consensus" are aspects > of how the > > elected members will behave within the elected assembly. And of > > course, the voters may rightly take such views into account > in their > > assessments of the candidates before they cast their votes. > But that > > is just part of candidate appraisal. Given a sensitive > voting system, > > the outcome (seats won) will reflect the views of the voters, which > > may include views on "seeking consensus". > > > > James > > > > > >> That is what in principle happens e.g. in > >> coalition governments. Coalition governments may represent > >> well over 50% of the voters. Let's assume that this is the > >> case. The program of the government may contain multiple > >> topics that would be 51% vs. 49% questions in the > >> representative body or among the voters, but probably all > >> coalition members will get more than they lose. Let's assume > >> that the coalition is heterogeneous so that it does not agree > >> on all the 51% vs. 49% decisions that is has to make. Maybe > >> there are two 51% vs. 49% topics that go the right way > >> against every one such topic that goes wrong. In that way we > >> don't have a narrow majority that always makes 51% decisions > >> but a supermajority that has considerably higher support behind > >> everything it does (although all parties of the coalition > >> do not like all the decisions). > >> > >> In two-party systems the balance is based more on two > >> alternating policies. Often both parties have quite centrist > >> policies since both try to meet the needs of the median > >> voters. In some topics they may however have also clearly > >> opposite positions. I guess the overall policy and results of > >> two-party system governments are typically more 51% majority > >> driven than in multi-party governments. (Coalition > >> governments may however also have only narrow majority and > >> the coalitions may be quite fixed, e.g. left vs. right, and > >> as a result their decisions may follow the 51% majority style.) > >> > >> My point is just that in addition to multi-winner methods and > >> proper PR one may need "the art of compromise decisions" to > >> get rid of the strongest 51% vs. 49% . This discussion went > >> already quite far from the technical properties of the > >> single-winner methods, but maybe this kind of compromise > >> making related problems can be considered to be one key > >> problem that the different methods and their use in societies > >> should try to address (if the case that one wants to replace > >> "the dictatorship of narrow majority" with "horse trading > >> deals of larger majorities"). > >> > >> Juho > > > > ---- > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em > for list info > ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info