> SODA is extremely easy for the voters; in fact, no voting system is simpler > to vote --it is pretty simple, but it seems to me plain approval is simpler. You're exaggerating.
> Under SODA, there is no need for dishonesty from individual voters. A voter > can safely vote for any candidate that they honestly agree with, without fear > of that vote being wasted; or safely vote an honest approval-style ballot, if > they do not agree with any candidate's preference order. --One can invent scenarios where "dishonest" SODA voting is strategically forced, i.e. you (as a voter) approve someone you like less than someone you do not approve. For example, in the 2 liberals vs 2 conservatives scenario in first example of http://www.rangevoting.org/RVstrat2.html in a situation where the candidates all refuse to state preference orders (or state orders you dislike). Another example: it seems to me in 3-candidate race with plurality-style delegating votes SODA becomes equivalent to instant runoff voting with 3 pre-stated vote types. It then suffers all the paradoxes obtainable from IRV via 3 vote types, e.g. favorite betrayal, and see http://www.rangevoting.org/CompleteIdioticIRV.html This is true even if every voter honestly agrees with the 3 available preference orders, and noting that a vote "A>B>C" via delegation is "more honest" than a vote such as "approve A and B." >SODA is easier to count and more fraud-resistant than most systems, including >IRV. It also can be run on most voting machines, including even old and >outdated systems. --somewhat debatable. It is certainly less easy to count than plain approval. Fraud resistance? Well, it's immune to some kinds but not to other kinds. Overall I'd say it probably offers more fraud opportunities than plain plurality. -- Warren D. Smith http://RangeVoting.org <-- add your endorsement (by clicking "endorse" as 1st step) and math.temple.edu/~wds/homepage/works.html ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
