2011/8/8 Warren Smith <[email protected]> > > SODA is extremely easy for the voters; in fact, no voting system is > simpler to vote > --it is pretty simple, but it seems to me plain approval is simpler. > You're exaggerating. >
Approval ballot is simpler, by one box. Approval strategy is way, way more complex. > > > Under SODA, there is no need for dishonesty from individual voters. A > voter can safely vote for any candidate that they honestly agree with, > without fear of that vote being wasted; or safely vote an honest > approval-style ballot, if they do not agree with any candidate's preference > order. > --One can invent scenarios where "dishonest" SODA voting is > strategically forced, > i.e. you (as a voter) approve someone you like less than someone you > do not approve. For example, in the 2 liberals vs 2 conservatives > scenario in first example of > http://www.rangevoting.org/RVstrat2.html > in a situation where the candidates all refuse to state preference > orders (or state orders you dislike). Since the advantage gained here is a tiny one, I don't think that counts as a "need". > Another example: it seems to me > in 3-candidate race with plurality-style > delegating votes SODA becomes equivalent to instant runoff voting with > 3 pre-stated vote types. Not at all. The CW or minimax/etc.... winner will win. > It then suffers all the paradoxes obtainable > from IRV via 3 vote types, e.g. favorite betrayal, and see > http://www.rangevoting.org/CompleteIdioticIRV.html > This is true even if every voter honestly agrees with the 3 available > preference orders, > and noting that a vote "A>B>C" via delegation is "more honest" than a > vote such as > "approve A and B." > How would you put this advantage? > > >SODA is easier to count and more fraud-resistant than most systems, > including IRV. It also can be run on most voting machines, including even > old and outdated systems. > --somewhat debatable. It is certainly less easy to count than plain > approval. > Fraud resistance? Well, it's immune to some kinds but not to other kinds. > Overall I'd say it probably offers more fraud opportunities than plain > plurality. > Yeah, I added that one at the last minute. Mostly I was comparing to IRV. > > > > -- > Warren D. Smith > http://RangeVoting.org <-- add your endorsement (by clicking > "endorse" as 1st step) > and > math.temple.edu/~wds/homepage/works.html >
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