Hi Richard, I am sending a small P.S. to clarify one of the ideas in my email below.
I think that the most viable transfer from an "old" one-round single-winner election system to a "new" system. Goes through a two round system, where the winner of the election in the "old" system meets the winner in the "new" system. This is the track for changes of voting system, which I think will have the biggest chance to get political support. A FPTP system would thus be reformed so that, the FPTP winner would meet the Condorcet/Approval/Score/Bucklin winner in the second round, if the two winners would be different. I think the reform of a two round system could take two different paths: 1) a three round system where a second run-off is held between the runoff winner in the second round and the Condorcet/Bucklin/Approval/Score winner from the first round, if the Condorcet/Bucklin/Approval/Score winner would be different from the two run-off candidates. 2) a two-round system, where the FPTP winner would meet the Condorcet/Bucklin/Approval/Score winner if they are different, otherwise we would have a normal run-off. In theory one might imagine a two-round election second round with three candidates, but then the second-round election system would not be a run-off election, which would maket the system politically more difficult to pass. Best regards Peter Zbornik On 8/31/11, Peter Zbornik <[email protected]> wrote: > Hi Richard, > > maybe a second round could take place between the winners of competing > methods, say Schulze winner vs Approval or Bucklin winner or any > other endorsed method. This would allow for election-methods > "competitions", and could address potential weaknesses of each method. > When one of the method would generate a "bad" winner, then the other > method could still give a "good" winner. For instance, if the Schulze > method would generate a winner noone has heard of before (the dark > horse), then in the second round, when he meets the Bucklin or > Approval winner, he or she might lose the second round, after new > details of his/her political past come to public knowledge due to the > increased attention given. The election methods should be different > for this approach to work. The obvious downside of this approach is > increased complexity and thus less public support. With this method > IRV might be used as one of the methods, or the old method could be > used against the new method. > > A second proposal: since most single winner methods have their > multiple-winner counterpart, the first round could proprtionally elect > two (or more) candidates, between which the second round would take > place. This solution would use one method for both rounds, thus > decrease complexity compared to the first proposal; the solution would > not require political party candidates; it would provide a solution > for the French presidential elections. The downside of this system is > that some of the multiple winner versions of the single-winner methods > are not used anywhere and exist only on paper and/or in vote-counting > software. > Example: 1st round: Schulze-STV elects two candidates for the runoff. > 2nd round: Schulze-Condorcet is used. > > Personally I think the issue of one vs two rounds of elections is a > neglected issue. For instance, if the Brittish liberals would have > chosen a run-off elections as the alternative to FPTP instead of IRV > (AV), then I think they would have found support in the referendum. > > A second issue, which I think the statement does not address, is the > minimal number of seats in each constituency, or in other words, the > number of regional constituencies in the election to one body, like > the parliament. If we have a 200 seat parliament and each constituency > has only two seats, elected proportionally, then we have a > proportional election system, with a quota of 33%. This is not a > system I can endorse. I would rather endorse low (max., say 5%) and > would prefer no quotas, i.e. the quota equals the votes needed for one > seat with only one constituency - around 0.5% for a 200 seat election. > Using a party list system, there might be constituencies which do not > hinder proportional representation, provided that there is a "National > constituency" of sufficient size, which makes sure that each party is > proportionally represented in the elected body (Swedish election > system). The national constituency would level-out any disproportional > representation of the parties, which might arise from the division of > the electorate into constituencies. Maybe a similar system could be > (or most probably has already been) constructed for open lists. The > voter would cast a vote in his/her constituency and at the same time a > vote in the national constituency. Question is then how to achieve a > proportional representation for open lists balancing the regional > constituencies and the national one. I think it is possible and should > not be too difficult but don't know how to do it. > > Maybe these questions have already been discussed. > > Best regards > Peter Zbornik > > On 8/30/11, Richard Fobes <[email protected]> wrote: >> Here is what I've just written for the new section titled "Multiple >> rounds of voting": >> >> ----------- begin ------------ >> >> In highly competitive elections, multiple rounds of voting are needed to >> eliminate the weakest candidates so that attention can be focused on >> electing one of the most popular candidates. Our supported election >> methods work as described for two rounds of voting if the first round of >> voting elects a single winner from each political party, and the second >> round chooses from among those winners. >> >> However, different counting methods are needed if the same voters vote >> in both rounds. There are election methods that handle such cases, and >> they use the better ballots we support. However, we have not yet >> analyzed this category of counting methods sufficiently to express >> support for any specific methods. >> >> We do strongly agree that single-mark ballots must not be used in any >> round of voting. More specifically, just as the candidate with the most >> first-choice votes is not necessarily the most popular, and the >> candidate with the fewest first-choice votes is not necessarily the >> least popular, the candidate with the second-most first-choice votes is >> not necessarily second-most popular, and the candidate with the >> second-fewest votes is not necessarily the second-least popular. >> >> Also we agree that "open primary" elections are not fair. In this >> approach, the candidates who are identified as "most popular", >> regardless of political-party affiliation, progress to the next round. >> This approach fails to consider that the majority of voters who support >> the most-popular candidate are likely to be the same majority of voters >> who support the second-most popular candidate -- unless the counting >> method specifically compensates for this redundant influence. The >> remaining voters, who may almost be a majority, can end up with only >> getting to choose between the two candidates who are preferred by the >> majority. Expressed another way, the words "most popular" are ambiguous >> in the context of choosing which candidates deserve to progress to >> another round of voting. >> >> ----------- end ------------ >> >> I'm sure I'm missing some important additional considerations, but they >> aren't coming to me at the moment, so I'll tap into your brains to help >> refine this section. >> >> Of course we aren't offering a fair way to handle French presidential >> (?) first-round elections (in terms of which two candidates should move >> on to the final runoff election), but we have nothing specific we would >> agree on, right? >> >> Richard Fobes >> >> >> >> ---- >> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list >> info >> > ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
