But you are completely missing the point of what I wrote. It is the political consequences of the second result that are important.
In the real world of partisan politics, such a weak Condorcet winner (and their policies) would likely be torn to shreds by the party politicians and their party members, to such an extent that s/he would be ineffectual in office. And based on my experience of UK electors, with their majoritarian views of elections, the weak Condorcet winner would get little support from those whose votes had voted him or her into office. It must be for others to judge whether the electors in their countries (USA, Canada) would react in a similar way, but I have seen nothing in the US or Canadian press to suggest otherwise. It is dirty practical politics that is the problem here, not the fact that voters could rank their choices honestly. In my view, such a result would be less acceptable to the electors than the plurality result, despite all the obvious defects in the plurality voting. That's just how it is - and if you want to achieve real, practical reform, you have to understand that. James Gilmour > -----Original Message----- > From: election-methods-boun...@lists.electorama.com > [mailto:election-methods-boun...@lists.electorama.com] On > Behalf Of Kathy Dopp > Sent: Friday, September 23, 2011 8:48 PM > To: election-methods@lists.electorama.com > Subject: Re: [EM] Election-Methods Digest, Vol 87, Issue 54 > > > In both the following cases, candidate C, the Condorcet > winner, is a GREAT choice because a majority of voters, in > both cases, would prefer C over A or B. This system allows > voters to honestly rank their choices, without worrying about > helping their least favorite candidate to win - far better > than methods like IRV or plurality. > > > 35 A>C > > 34 B>C > > 31 C > > > > 48 A>C > > 47 B>C > > 5 C > ---- > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em > for list info ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
