But you are completely missing the point of what I wrote. It is the political
consequences of the second result that are important.
In the real world of partisan politics, such a weak Condorcet winner (and their
policies) would likely be torn to shreds by the
party politicians and their party members, to such an extent that s/he would be
ineffectual in office. And based on my experience
of UK electors, with their majoritarian views of elections, the weak Condorcet
winner would get little support from those whose
votes had voted him or her into office. It must be for others to judge whether
the electors in their countries (USA, Canada) would
react in a similar way, but I have seen nothing in the US or Canadian press to
suggest otherwise.
It is dirty practical politics that is the problem here, not the fact that
voters could rank their choices honestly. In my view,
such a result would be less acceptable to the electors than the plurality
result, despite all the obvious defects in the plurality
voting. That's just how it is - and if you want to achieve real, practical
reform, you have to understand that.
James Gilmour
-----Original Message-----
From: [email protected]
[mailto:[email protected]] On
Behalf Of Kathy Dopp
Sent: Friday, September 23, 2011 8:48 PM
To: [email protected]
Subject: Re: [EM] Election-Methods Digest, Vol 87, Issue 54
In both the following cases, candidate C, the Condorcet
winner, is a GREAT choice because a majority of voters, in
both cases, would prefer C over A or B. This system allows
voters to honestly rank their choices, without worrying about
helping their least favorite candidate to win - far better
than methods like IRV or plurality.
35 A>C
34 B>C
31 C
48 A>C
47 B>C
5 C
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------------------------------
Message: 4
Date: Fri, 23 Sep 2011 18:22:42 -0400
From: Kathy Dopp<[email protected]>
To: [email protected]
Subject: Re: [EM] Election-Methods Digest, Vol 87, Issue 54
Message-ID:
<CANqewJT-qK=CrgFKC=Q=cudNY0hnRkzkE_HR4=q5q0kgn6k...@mail.gmail.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
James,
My point is, that the two examples you gave IMO are very *strong*
Condorcet winners in the sense that the vast majority of voters would
prefer the Condorcet winner over one or the other of the other two
candidates which are far less popularly approved.
I think the IRV fanatics oppose centrist compromise winners who are
supported by a majority of voters whenever IRV would elect a less
popular winner. IRV proponents support a more extremist winner,
supported by far fewer voters as long as the candidate, enough to
fabricate hypothetical political consequences, claiming that a
majority people would oppose the Condorcet winner. Sure, of course at
least a few persons who had supported the 1st round plurality winner
would complain, but that is probably all. I.e. IRV proponents seem to
be deeply emotionally attached to the method, regardless of how much
unhappiness the outcome would cause in how large a proportion of
voters by eliminating the Condorcet winner, as it did in Burlington,
VT.
Burlington, VT is a real life counterexample to your counterfactual,
where people would have preferred the Condorcet winner and so got rid
of IRV.
On Fri, Sep 23, 2011 at 6:02 PM, James Gilmour<[email protected]> wrote:
But you are completely missing the point of what I wrote. ?It is the political
consequences of the second result that are important.
In the real world of partisan politics, such a weak Condorcet winner (and their
policies) would likely be torn to shreds by the
party politicians and their party members, to such an extent that s/he would be
ineffectual in office. ?And based on my experience
of UK electors, with their majoritarian views of elections, the weak Condorcet
winner would get little support from those whose
votes had voted him or her into office. ?It must be for others to judge whether
the electors in their countries (USA, Canada) would
react in a similar way, but I have seen nothing in the US or Canadian press to
suggest otherwise.
It is dirty practical politics that is the problem here, not the fact that
voters could rank their choices honestly. ?In my view,
such a result would be less acceptable to the electors than the plurality
result, despite all the obvious defects in the plurality
voting. ?That's just how it is ?- ?and if you want to achieve real, practical
reform, you have to understand that.
James Gilmour
? ? ? ? ? ?35 A>C
? ? ? ? ? ?34 B>C
? ? ? ? ? ?31 C
? ? ? ? ? ?48 A>C
? ? ? ? ? ?47 B>C
? ? ? ? ? ? 5 C
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