Hi Mike, --- En date de : Lun 24.10.11, MIKE OSSIPOFF <[email protected]> a écrit : > Co-operation/Defection Criterion (CD): > > Premise: > > A majority prefer A and B to everyone else, and the rest of > the voters all prefer everyone else to A and B. > > Candidate A is the Condorcet candidate > > Voting is sincere except that the B voters (voters > preferring B to everyone) else refuse to vote A over anyone. > > > Requirement: > > The Condorcet candidate wins. > > [end of CD definition] > > I’m only aware of one method that meets CD: MMPO.
When I simplify this scenario in my head it seems like a combination of SDSC and SFC. Basically A will have a majority over B, and B will have a majority over third candidate C (if there are only three), and A will not have a voted majority over C. A might even lose to C (unless "Condorcet candidate" is defined on cast votes), but it won't be by a majority. In this scenario, SDSC prevents C from winning and SFC prevents B from winning. I'm assuming cast ballots look something like this: 48 C>A ~26 A>B ~26 B (sincere is B>A) Is this wrong? Kevin ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
