Hi Mike, --- En date de : Lun 24.10.11, MIKE OSSIPOFF <[email protected]> a écrit : > You wrote: > > Basically A will have a majority over B > > endquote > > Not necessarily. A will certainly have a pairwise win over > B. When the non {A,B} > candidates lose, and MMPO is applied to its A,B tie, that > pairwise win will mean > that B has a greater pairwise opposition than A does.
Thanks for the correction. So, when I reduce this to pairwise terms (which I do for convenience) I see this criterion in effect: If some candidate A has simple pairwise wins over every candidate in a set of candidates "B" and has no majority pairwise losses to any candidate in a set of candidates "C", and every candidate in the set "C" has a majority pairwise loss to every candidate in set "B," then candidate A must win. If it wasn't already clear, this definitely won't be compatible with the Plurality criterion. I know that won't bother you though. As far as methods that will satisfy it, we at least have some clumsy ones. Any Condorcet method used to complete majority-defeat- disqualification or CDTT (i.e. Schwartz set that replaces sub-majority wins with ties) will do the trick. These methods would also satisfy SDSC fully. I am not sure that MMPO as you propose it actually does the trick. It seems to depend on the A-B tied score which I'm not sure is guaranteed. Particularly if "C" is multiple candidates. Kevin ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
