Hi Chris and Mike, --- En date de : Jeu 27.10.11, C.Benham <[email protected]> a écrit : > Kevin, > Addressing Mike Ossipoff on EM, you recently (26 Oct 2011) > wrote: > > > None of them satisfy FBC, but neither does your > version of MMPO. > > Mike's suggested version of MMPO is to resolve ties > by eliminating the tied losing > candidates and then starting again > > Can you please show us an example of it failing FBC?
Mike's method is Condorcet//MMPO//Condorcet//MMPO//etc. Being a Condorcet method it would be quite astonishing if it satisfied FBC since I think we mostly agree that Condorcet is incompatible with FBC. However, even if Mike's method were just MMPO//MMPO//MMPO//etc I still highly doubt that would satisfy FBC, because the candidate eliminations and recalculations make it unclear that votes will work as expected. I don't know how to say this much more clearly than that. But let me ask you, how many FBC-satisfying methods involve eliminating candidates and then recalculating scores once those candidates are removed? Not a one. ICA, MDDA, and MAMPO all "disqualify" candidates but the tie-breaking score at the end doesn't and couldn't depend on which candidates are disqualified. Hypothetically, off the top of my head, lowering your true favorite could remove him from a three-way score tie which then (as a two-way) is resolved for one of your "other" favorites, whereas the three-way contest is resolved for a disliked candidate. Not a very likely problem, but that's not the point. Kevin ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
