Jameson Quinn wrote:
Condorcet*: Elects center with honesty? Yes; 10/10
Doesn't elect Condorcet loser, even with strategy? Usually not, though
it is in theory possible for the L voters to shoot themselves in the
foot by strategically provoking a L>R>C>L cycle but end up electing R
thereby. SInce this is pretty implausible, I'll give Condorcet systems
5/5 here.
Could elect pairwise winner of extremes if Center is inherently weak? No
way. 0/5
Total quality: 15/20
Do you think a hybrid cardinal/Condorcet method could avoid a weak
Center, or would it have to fail the (rank-based) Condorcet criterion in
order to do so?
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