2011/11/7 Kristofer Munsterhjelm <[email protected]> > Jameson Quinn wrote: > > Condorcet*: Elects center with honesty? Yes; 10/10 >> >> Doesn't elect Condorcet loser, even with strategy? Usually not, though it >> is in theory possible for the L voters to shoot themselves in the foot by >> strategically provoking a L>R>C>L cycle but end up electing R thereby. >> SInce this is pretty implausible, I'll give Condorcet systems 5/5 here. >> Could elect pairwise winner of extremes if Center is inherently weak? No >> way. 0/5 >> Total quality: 15/20 >> > > Do you think a hybrid cardinal/Condorcet method could avoid a weak Center, > or would it have to fail the (rank-based) Condorcet criterion in order to > do so? > > At the moment, I suspect it would have to fail the condorcet criterion. I suspect such failure would be akin to how median-based methods (MJ, Bucklin, etc.) fail Condorcet; that is, something that might never even happen for large-electorate elections. Both of these suspicions are weak intuitions at the moment and I could be wrong.
Jameson
---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
