Hi Mike,
{quote}
Kevin--
You wrote:
ER-IRV(whole) doesn't satisfy FBC. You may need to demote your favorite in order
to get a preferable elimination order.
[endquote]
How? Say that there's a particular candidate whom you need to have win.
You can give him a vote by downrating your favorite in order to get hir
eliminated soon,
so that your ballot will give a vote to the compromise. But you could also just
give the
compromise an immediate vote, by ranking hir in 1st place. Why would you need
to do otherwise
in order to help hir win?
{end quote}
Because your compromise's ability to win may depend on which candidates were
eliminated and when. By downranking your favorite you can affect that.
{quote}
What do you mean when you say "even when the scenario isn't S? If "S"
represents a scenario
meeting the stipulations of the criterion's premise, then the criterion only
makes a requirement
when those stipulations are met. It says nothing about any other scenario.
That's true of all
criteria, not just mine.
No criterion, including mine, says anything about what should happen when the
"scenario" described
by its premise-stipulagions doesn't happen.
{end quote}
This is a difference of theory and practice. In theory a criterion only
addresses the sincere
scenarios in mentions. In practice it will have broader implications. That's
all it is.
{quote}
You _weren't_ right Bucklin(= whole simultaneous)
not meeting FBC, because you were thinking that FBC requires that no one need
to
vote someone equal to their favorite. Actually, FBC requires only that
no one need to vote someone _over_ their favorite.
{end quote}
I erroneously claimed ERBucklin(whole) failed monotonocity, because I
misunderstood how
the method worked. I don't remember ever saying ERBW failed FBC.
{quote}
Yes, SFC protects sincere CWs. Do SFC complying methods protect other
candidates who don't
have a majority defeat (and, in that way "look like sincere CWs)? Sure. What's
the problem
with that?
{end quote}
There's no problem with that. It's just an observation that a criterion like
SFC may have
implications beyond the scenarios it purports to deal with.
Kevin----
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
