2011/11/9 <[email protected]> > I'm assuming "approval bad example" is typified by the implicit approval > order in the scenario > > 49 C > 27 A>B > 24 B > > It seems to me that IF we (1) want to respect the Plurality Criterion, (2) > discourage "chicken" strategy, > (3) stick with determinism, and (4) not take advantage of proxy ideas, > then our method must allow > equal-rank-top and elect C in the above scenario, but elect B when B is > advanced to top equal with A in > the middle faction: > > 49 C > 27 A=B > 24 B > > Then if sincere preferences are > > 49 C > 27 A>B > 24 B>A, > > the B faction will be deterred from truncating A. While if the B > supporters are sincerely indifferent > between A and C, the A supporters can vote approval style (A=B) to get B > elected. > > Do we agree on this? >
I do, at least. I disagree with any criteria that say that A must win in the top example; that only encourages A voters to dishonestly add B even if they don't prefer her. > > Note that IRV (=whole) satisfies this, but now the question remains ... is > there a method that satisfies > this which also satisfies the FBC? > Yes. 321 voting <http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/321_voting>. > > Forest > ---- > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info >
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