2011/11/9 Jameson Quinn <[email protected]> > 2011/11/9 <[email protected]> > >> I'm assuming "approval bad example" is typified by the implicit approval >> order in the scenario >> >> 49 C >> 27 A>B >> 24 B >> >> It seems to me that IF we (1) want to respect the Plurality Criterion, >> (2) discourage "chicken" strategy, >> (3) stick with determinism, and (4) not take advantage of proxy ideas, >> then our method must allow >> equal-rank-top and elect C in the above scenario, but elect B when B is >> advanced to top equal with A in >> the middle faction: >> >> 49 C >> 27 A=B >> 24 B >> >> Then if sincere preferences are >> >> 49 C >> 27 A>B >> 24 B>A, >> >> the B faction will be deterred from truncating A. While if the B >> supporters are sincerely indifferent >> between A and C, the A supporters can vote approval style (A=B) to get B >> elected. >> >> Do we agree on this? >> > > I do, at least. I disagree with any criteria that say that A must win in > the top example; that only encourages A voters to dishonestly add B even if > they don't prefer her. > > >> >> Note that IRV (=whole) satisfies this, but now the question remains ... >> is there a method that satisfies >> this which also satisfies the FBC? >> > > Yes. 321 voting <http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/321_voting>. >
Note that 321 voting can fail the chicken dilemma/ABE if there are clones of candidate C. However, it would take some fine vote management to ensure that the clones worked but didn't win. Personally, I believe that a party cloning strategy would be very hard in practice. Jameson > >> >> Forest >> ---- >> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list >> info >> > >
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