The scenario: > 49: C > 27: A>B > 24: B(>A sincere)
Options: 1. Elect B pro: it makes sense given the ballots con: the B voters are getting away with their strategy, and next time the A voters will probably follow them. 2. Elect A pro: It is correct for these sincere preferences con: it is badly wrong for other possible sincere preferences that could have given these ballots, especially if the A voters are only strategically voting for B. 3. Elect C pro: well, that will teach those sneaky B voters a lesson! con: What if the B voters were being sincere? 4. Allow candidate C to choose whether A or B is elected. (The SODA solution) pro: assuming that this is a 1D spectrum, the CW is elected. con: C could deliberately choose the worse of the two, with his eye on next time. (But the unlikeliness that voters would actually reward C for this nihilistic behavior, should help to convince C not to do this.) My preference over these options: 4>3>1>2. Apparently, Mike Osipoff's preferences are something close to the reverse of this. Jameson
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