Jameson/Mike,
De : Jameson Quinn <[email protected]>
>>>À : Kevin Venzke <[email protected]>
>>>Cc : em <[email protected]>
>>>Envoyé le : Jeudi 17 Novembre 2011 12h48
>>>Objet : Re: [EM] Re : Votes-only criteria vs preference criteria. IRV
>>>squeeze-effect. Divulge IRV election specifics?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>2011/11/17 Kevin Venzke <[email protected]>
>>>..In practice [preference-mentioning criteria] usually have to be translated
>>>into votes-only criteria in order to figure out how to use or test them.
>>>Yes, this is another (better?) way of putting what I said about "Criteria
>>>which apply to ballots and mention preferences".
>>>
>>>Jameson
>>>
>>
>>
>>
>Well, in my mind a votes-only criterion is independent. Usually the two
>versions aren't quite equivalent or can't be easily proven to be equivalent.
>
>I think part of the disagreement on this issue is based on who the audience
>is. On this list we don't generally have problems with most people using an
>implied Woodall-ish conception of methods and criteria. If someone wanted to
>argue that FPP actually does satisfy Condorcet we would just tell them they're
>doing it wrong and shrug them off, no big deal. Mike seems to be paranoid
>about people understanding criteria contrary to their original intention.
>
>The inconvenient thing about e.g. SDSC is mostly the "should have a way of
>voting" wording. In practice this "way of voting" is almost always truncation
>(which definitely is possible to define within Mike's scheme, as he doesn't
>consider truncation of two candidates to be voting them equal). Mike's wording
>does allow a method to satisfy the criterion alternatively using an explicit
>approval cutoff or something. So I recognize that he is getting something
>additional, that is not useless, from his choice of wording.
>
>I wonder if SDSC can really be seamlessly applied to any ballot format though.
>Mike seems to assume it is unambiguous what it means to vote a candidate above
>or equal to or below another candidate. If he has a definition for these I
>imagine it's based on some very specific test that wouldn't necessarily
>reflect general method behavior. For example, what if under some method the
>majority preferring A to B can make B lose by ranking B top? One could say
>(see definition below) that this is no good, because B is being ranked "over"
>A. But how do we know whether that's "over"? Based on this one very
>counterintuitive result, it doesn't look like "over."
>
>What if voters can vote cycles? What if they put candidates in color-coded
>buckets and the outcome is determined by even vs. odd vote counts? I think at
>some point, any criterion scheme has to say "use your head, you know what I'm
>trying to say," and where it says that is mostly a matter of taste.
>
>For reference, this is SDSC:
>If a majority of all the voters prefer A to B, then they should have a way of
>voting that will ensure that B won't win, without any member of that majority
>voting a less-liked candidate equal to or over a more-liked candidate.
>
>Kevin
>
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