I like Mike's discussion of three slot methods. I could live with any of his suggestions including 3 slot MMPO, MTA, MCA, MDD,TR, etc.
Some other possibilities to consider: I. In 3 slot MMPO take into account the magnitude of each ballot opposition as well as the number of ballots with opposition; In this version a ballot that rates X two slots above Y contributes twice as much opposition against Y by X as a ballot that rates X only one slot above Y. Note that in this version the difference between the opposition of X against Y and the opposition of Y against X turns out to be the same as the difference in their respective range scores. II. Elect the candidate unrated on the fewest ballots. In case of a tie, elect the tied candidate with the greatest number of top ratings. Someone may object that the difference between top and middle only comes into play when there is a tie. But remember that no matter the method, the only time your vote ever makes a difference is in making or breaking a tie. III. Smith//Range I'll talk more about this later. I used to like Smith//Approval better, but now I'm starting to change my mind. There are descriptions of this method that do not require defining or detecting the Smith set. ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
