MTA <http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/MTA>? CD<http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/CD>? 1CM <http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/1CM>?
Also, although I happen to understand them, FBC<http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/FBC>, LNHa <http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/LNHa>, SFC<http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/SFC> , 3P <http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/3P>, ABE<http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/ABE>, and RCW <http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/RCW>. Cut-and-pastes from old email messages are fine. I've done 4 or 5 abbreviation pages , at least 2 of which I've never used myself, so I think it's fair to start asking the people who are relying on the abbreviations to do the work themselves. Jameson 2011/11/19 MIKE OSSIPOFF <[email protected]> > > You wrote: > > You could of course argue that "if I gave it to B, A would have been > just as unhappy, and if I gave it to A, B would have been just as > unhappy, so I dare you to show me the particular group that has been > wronged by this". I still think that you can say that you wronged the > two groups as a whole > > [endquote] > > Ok, sure. You may have wronged them collectively, by electing someone over > whom > no one in either group prefers anyone other than their favorite. > > The question is, how badly does that wrong them? > > Badly enough to give up FBC, SFC, LNHa, CD, and Mono-Add-Plump? > > The ABE problem might be a peculiarly American problem. I don't expect > others > to recognize it as a problem. We have the Republocrats, and, additionally, > lots of > small factions who are terribly mutually antagonistic, jealous, and > rivalry-inclined; but > which, together, might add up to a majority. > > When the method in use meets LNHa and CD, you can middle-rate lesser-evils > if you want to, instead of > not rating them. You can do that completely freely, with no strategic > hesitation. That > would make all the difference in the U.S. > > > You wrote: > > > >> Pleasing the two A=C and B=C voters is not worth 9999 votes. > > > > [endquote] > > > > I've emphasized that I don't justify MMPO's result by saying that > > it's for those two voters. MMPO's rule's purpose is to meet FBC, SFC > > or SFC3, Later-No-Harm, CD, and Mono-Add-Plump. > > > > And the cost of those big advantages is...what? The election of > > someone that over whom no one prefers anyone other than their > > favorite? > > You replied: > > So to be more precise, you're pleasing the two voters at the cost of the > 9999 others so that you can pass the criteria above. > > ]endquote] > > I explicitly said that it isn't for those two voters. But yes, it's in > order to gain > those criterion-compliances. Whether electing C, over whom no one prefers > anyone other > than their favorite, wrongs someone too badly, is a matter for individual > judgment, > a judgement that depends on whether, in your country, FBC, LNHa and CD are > necessary. > > FBC is absolutely necessary here. LNHa and CD are very desirable, for the > reason stated above. > > You wrote: > > If you highly value > the FBC, I can see that the criteria could outweigh the bizarre result. > In my particular case, I don't consider FBC very important. > > [endquote] > > Of course you don't. You aren't in the U.S., England or Australia, where > FBC is necessary > to avoid large-scale favorite-burial. > > Anyway, the electoral systems of most European countries are probably fine > as-is. > > You continued: > > But even if you like the FBC, couldn't you use one of the other methods > that pass FBC? I don't think any of these have such serious instances of > getting it wrong as Kevin's example shows MMPO does. > > (Though if you consider it important that a method should pass all the > criteria above, and do so more than you think MMPO gets it wrong in > Kevin's scenario, then sure.) > > [endquote] > > Quite so. That's why I consider MTA a good proposal, maybe the best. Of > the methods I've > described to people new to voting systems, MTA is by far the most popular. > It's simple, > obvious and natural. It meets FBC, 1CM, 3P, and avoids the possible > public-relations problems of failing > Mono-Add-Plump or Kevin's MMPO bad-example. > > If there is one method I'd propose, it's MTA. But, when there's > opportunity for discussion, to find out > if something better still is ask-able, I'd advocate such methods as MMPO, > MDDTR, and RCW (if I find that people don't > consider RCW too complicated). ..because, for the reasons that I've told > elsewhere, I consider the ABE to be > a serious problem in this country. > > ABE failure can be dealt with, as I mentioned before. The A voters can say: > > "If we were all co-operative and amicable, we could all vote for all of > our candidates. We all know > that isn't so. Our faction is the largest non-C candidate, and the one who > will have the most top > ratings (or votes in Approval). Therefore, we're going to vote only for A. > At such time as the B faction > is larger than ours, then we will vote for B, just as we're now asking you > to vote for A." > > I'd be glad just to get the criterion compliances of MTA or even Approval. > > Let me get specific about the lesser-evils problem: > > Here, we have two Greens parties: The original Greens, and the larger > newer Greens intended to > replace them. In MTA I'd top rate the original Greens. I'd vote for them > in Approval. > > In MTA, I wouldn't middle-rate the newer replacment Greens. In Approval, I > wouldn't vote > for them. But, in MDDTR, MMPO or RCW, I'd middle rate the newer > replacement Greens, because there's absolutely no > strategic reason not to. > > Not relevant to this subject, another principle that relates to > lesser-evils: > > If, by rejecting some lesser-evil, your faction isn't big enough to > thereby make them lose, then of > course you've lost nothing, but you've made a point. > > If your faction is strong enouth to make them lose, then you've made an > even stronger point. > You've said, "principled people won't support your compromise". > > Mike Ossipoff > > > > > Sure, that might help them win, but not at the expense of anyone better. > ...only instead of the Republocrats. > > > > ---- > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info >
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