On Nov 19, 2011, at 5:25 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
MTA? CD? 1CM?
Also, although I happen to understand them, FBC, LNHa, SFC, 3P, ABE,
and RCW. Cut-and-pastes from old email messages are fine. I've done
4 or 5 abbreviation pages , at least 2 of which I've never used
myself, so I think it's fair to start asking the people who are
relying on the abbreviations to do the work themselves.
It would help if, when continuing a conversation, talkers would help
readers connect the parts by the "subject" staying the same or, at
least, having the previous subject referenced in the body.
Passing out abbreviation pages would help if their "subject" made them
findable.
Note that one detail in this conversation is sorting out the meaning
of the various identifiers such as ABE.
Dave Ketchum
Jameson
2011/11/19 MIKE OSSIPOFF <[email protected]>
You wrote:
You could of course argue that "if I gave it to B, A would have been
just as unhappy, and if I gave it to A, B would have been just as
unhappy, so I dare you to show me the particular group that has been
wronged by this". I still think that you can say that you wronged the
two groups as a whole
[endquote]
Ok, sure. You may have wronged them collectively, by electing
someone over whom
no one in either group prefers anyone other than their favorite.
The question is, how badly does that wrong them?
Badly enough to give up FBC, SFC, LNHa, CD, and Mono-Add-Plump?
The ABE problem might be a peculiarly American problem. I don't
expect others
to recognize it as a problem. We have the Republocrats, and,
additionally, lots of
small factions who are terribly mutually antagonistic, jealous, and
rivalry-inclined; but
which, together, might add up to a majority.
When the method in use meets LNHa and CD, you can middle-rate lesser-
evils if you want to, instead of
not rating them. You can do that completely freely, with no
strategic hesitation. That
would make all the difference in the U.S.
> You wrote:
>
>> Pleasing the two A=C and B=C voters is not worth 9999 votes.
>
> [endquote]
>
> I've emphasized that I don't justify MMPO's result by saying that
> it's for those two voters. MMPO's rule's purpose is to meet FBC, SFC
> or SFC3, Later-No-Harm, CD, and Mono-Add-Plump.
>
> And the cost of those big advantages is...what? The election of
> someone that over whom no one prefers anyone other than their
> favorite?
You replied:
So to be more precise, you're pleasing the two voters at the cost of
the
9999 others so that you can pass the criteria above.
]endquote]
I explicitly said that it isn't for those two voters. But yes, it's
in order to gain
those criterion-compliances. Whether electing C, over whom no one
prefers anyone other
than their favorite, wrongs someone too badly, is a matter for
individual judgment,
a judgement that depends on whether, in your country, FBC, LNHa and
CD are necessary.
FBC is absolutely necessary here. LNHa and CD are very desirable,
for the reason stated above.
You wrote:
If you highly value
the FBC, I can see that the criteria could outweigh the bizarre
result.
In my particular case, I don't consider FBC very important.
[endquote]
Of course you don't. You aren't in the U.S., England or Australia,
where FBC is necessary
to avoid large-scale favorite-burial.
Anyway, the electoral systems of most European countries are
probably fine as-is.
You continued:
But even if you like the FBC, couldn't you use one of the other
methods
that pass FBC? I don't think any of these have such serious
instances of
getting it wrong as Kevin's example shows MMPO does.
(Though if you consider it important that a method should pass all the
criteria above, and do so more than you think MMPO gets it wrong in
Kevin's scenario, then sure.)
[endquote]
Quite so. That's why I consider MTA a good proposal, maybe the best.
Of the methods I've
described to people new to voting systems, MTA is by far the most
popular. It's simple,
obvious and natural. It meets FBC, 1CM, 3P, and avoids the possible
public-relations problems of failing
Mono-Add-Plump or Kevin's MMPO bad-example.
If there is one method I'd propose, it's MTA. But, when there's
opportunity for discussion, to find out
if something better still is ask-able, I'd advocate such methods as
MMPO, MDDTR, and RCW (if I find that people don't
consider RCW too complicated). ..because, for the reasons that
I've told elsewhere, I consider the ABE to be
a serious problem in this country.
ABE failure can be dealt with, as I mentioned before. The A voters
can say:
"If we were all co-operative and amicable, we could all vote for all
of our candidates. We all know
that isn't so. Our faction is the largest non-C candidate, and the
one who will have the most top
ratings (or votes in Approval). Therefore, we're going to vote only
for A. At such time as the B faction
is larger than ours, then we will vote for B, just as we're now
asking you to vote for A."
I'd be glad just to get the criterion compliances of MTA or even
Approval.
Let me get specific about the lesser-evils problem:
Here, we have two Greens parties: The original Greens, and the
larger newer Greens intended to
replace them. In MTA I'd top rate the original Greens. I'd vote for
them in Approval.
In MTA, I wouldn't middle-rate the newer replacment Greens. In
Approval, I wouldn't vote
for them. But, in MDDTR, MMPO or RCW, I'd middle rate the newer
replacement Greens, because there's absolutely no
strategic reason not to.
Not relevant to this subject, another principle that relates to
lesser-evils:
If, by rejecting some lesser-evil, your faction isn't big enough to
thereby make them lose, then of
course you've lost nothing, but you've made a point.
If your faction is strong enouth to make them lose, then you've made
an even stronger point.
You've said, "principled people won't support your compromise".
Mike Ossipoff
Sure, that might help them win, but not at the expense of anyone
better. ...only instead of the Republocrats.
----
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
