Hi Jameson,
De : Jameson Quinn <[email protected]>
>>À : Chris Benham <[email protected]>
>>Cc : MIKE OSSIPOFF <[email protected]>; "[email protected]"
>><[email protected]>; em <[email protected]>
>>Envoyé le : Mercredi 23 Novembre 2011 4h18
>>Objet : Re: [EM] An ABE solution
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>>
>>My perspective is the following:
>>1. Most real-world elections will have a sincere CW, although that might not
>>be visible from the ballots.
>>1a. Those elections without a sincere CW don't really have a "wrong answer",
>>so I don't worry as much about the pathologies in that case.
>>2. Therefore, we can divide FBC-violating strategies into two (overlapping)
>>classes: those which work when there is not a CW among the other voters,
>>which I will call "offensive" strategies, and which usually work by creating
>>a false cycle; and those which work when there is no CW among the other
>>voters, which I will call "defensive".
>>3. I consider that a method with no "offensive" FBC violations is good
>>enough. That's why I've used those labels: why would "defensive" strategies
>>be a problem if "offensive" ones weren't?
>
>
Having some problems understanding where you're coming from. A defensive
FBC-violating strategy isn't likely going to be
provoked by an offensive FBC-violating strategy. I would expect it to be
provoked by the truncation of other voters.
If you want to say that it's enough for methods to not be suspectible to
strategies that would necessitiate defensive compromise
from other voters, then I might agree, but that is almost the same thing, in
practice, as saying the method should satisfy FBC.
Kevin
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