2011/11/26 MIKE OSSIPOFF <[email protected]> > > Jameson: > > You said: > > There are other methods which you don't mention even though their > advantages are similar to those of the ones you do. > > 2011/11/25 MIKE OSSIPOFF <[email protected]> > > > > > Regarding the co-operation/defection problem, there are about 4 > possibilities: > > > > 1. Just propose MTA and Keep the co-operation/defection problem. > > Majority > Judgment has similar advantages to MTA in this case. > > [endquote] > > Does it? Who knows?
Anyone who takes the time to read the academic literature<https://sites.google.com/site/ridalaraki/majority-judgment> . > Have its proponents told what criteria it meets and specifically what > guarantees it > offers? > > How does it do in the Approval bad-example? Same as MTA. That is, honest-votes will reliably give a good result, unlike unstable Approval; but strategic voting will lead to failure. > (to compare it to MTAOC) > > If you're unwilling to research the published answers to your own questions, why do you persist in asking us to look up your alphabet soup in old posts? For instance, I know what you mean by MTAOC (a system with a strong dishonest-fill incentive, which could be almost as bad as Borda in practice), but searching past messages for that acronym just gives the written-out name, and then it would take a separate search (which, if you happened to be using a strict search engine, would fail) to find the actual definition. > What majority-rule guarantees does it offer? Does it meet 3P or 1CM? > It meets 3P, which I happen to remember what it means. If you define 1CM<http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/1CM>I'll tell you if it meets that. > > It probably has a strategy situation very much like that of ordinary RV. > The method of summed scores. > No. For most voters in real-world studies of MJ, their honest, not-even-normalized MJ ballot was strategically optimal. That is clearly far better than Range. > > > 4. Find a simpler method that has those advantages. > > Such as SODA. > > [endquote] > > Go ahead and propose the enactment of SODA somewhere if you think that a > method involving > delegates or proxies is as winnable as methods that do not. > I am working to do so. Note that SODA proxies are 100% optional, and also bound to a predeclared strategy in ways that should prevent most corrupt proxy use. > > If one is going to propose a method involving proxies, then Proxy DD is > the biggest and most > ambitious improvment. I described it in a posting when you asked about it. > Yes, you reinvented Liquid Democracy / Asset Voting / Delegable Proxy. That's a very good system but it is a far, far more radical change than SODA. As Kristofer pointed out, for one thing it abandons the secret ballot entirely. Jameson
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