Mike, Right ON!
But I tripped up for a second on an unintentional typo concerning Richie's second claim... > 2. The article said that the best strategy in Approval is to > rank the candidates sincerely. Replace "Approval" with "IRV" in the above statement: Forest > From: MIKE OSSIPOFF > To: > Subject: [EM] FairVote in _Science_ magazine > Message-ID: > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" > > > Looking at some back-pages of electology discussion, I was > reminded of > Richie's article in _Science_ magazine, published some time ago. > > First, it's astonishing that someone like Richie was able to > publish in _Science_. > > But equally astonishing was that he could make the statements > that he made there, > and they were published without being checked for accuracy. > > The postings pointed out two really silly statements made in the > article: > 1. The article said that, according to (unnamed?) experts, > voters in Approval > elections will tend to approve only one candidate. > > That statement was answered in the electology posting. I'd > answered it for Richie > decades ago. > > Regarding the very many people who now think that they need to > vote (in Plurality) for > the Democrat, and who say that that's necessary as a "pragmatic" > vote, to > avoid wasting their vote, and who say that it's necessary to > "hold your nose" and > vote for Democrat, though you don't really like her--Richie > thinks that those > people are suddenly going to start voting only for their > favorite? :-)? > > No, those hold-their-nose lesser-of-2-evils Democrat voters, if > we switched to Approval, > would continue voting for the Democrat in Approval. The > difference is that, with Approval, > they can also vote for everyone whom they like better than the > Democrat. > Of course, if it turns out, based on the Approval election vote- > totals, or from > (newly) honest and relevant polling, that those voters' favorite > can beat the Republican, > then of course, at that time, they might very well stop voting > for the Democrat, and > might start voting only for one or more candidates whom they > like better than the > Democrats. > > One thing that Richie doesn't understand is that, if a voter, in > Approval, votes > only for hir favorite, that's because s/he feels that hir > favorite has a win, or > that s/he doesn't consider anyone else to be acceptable. That's > not a disadvantage of Approval. > That's good strategy. Maybe Approval vote totals will soon show > that progressive, > better-than-Democrat candidates have a win and that their > supporters needn't vote for > a Democrat in Approval. That could result in well-informed, good- > strategy "plumping", > "bullet-voting". > > But, more likely, people will vote, in Approval, for a set of > progressives, who are similar, > and similarly-good candidates. ...unless there's only one that > they consider acceptable, > or unless their favorite appears to have a clear win over all > the others. > > Approval strategy, when the election has completely unacceptable > candidates who could win, > is to vote for all of the acceptable candidates and for none of > the unacceptable candidates. > > But regarding the person who now holds their nose and votes for > a Democrat whom s/he doesn't > like, though s/he likes others more--That person will, in > Approval, vote for that > same Democrat, and for everyone whom s/he likes more.? ...until > Approval's vote totals, > or genuinely worthwhile polling, show that there's no need to > vote for the unliked > Democrat. > > 2. The article said that the best strategy in Approval is to > rank the candidates > sincerely. > > ...and that was published in _Science_ magazine :-) > > It's common knowledge that strategy incentive is present in all > nonprobabilistic voting systems. > Richie's statement is hardly surprising, coming, as it does, > from Richie. > But it's indeed surprising that no one at _Science_ questioned > the accuracy > of that statement before publishing it. > > But, then, that could be said of statement #1, above, too. > > Just as with the other statement, I and others had explained the > incorrectness of > that statement to Richie decades ago. > > As is common knowledge among everyone who discusses voting > systems (except for Richie, evidently), > your needed compromise can be eliminated because s/he didn't > have your vote yet, when s/he > needed it, because your vote was on your favorite instead. > Voting for your favorite instead > of insincerely voting your compromise in 1st place, has given > the election to someone who is > worse than your compromise. How to avoid that? Rank your > compromise in 1st place, burying > your favorite. > > It's been reported that, when IRV is used in in national > elections, many voters say that they vote > for a lesser-of-2-evils compromise in 1st place, burying their > favorite, so as not to > "waste [their] vote."? Maybe not coincidentally, the use of IRV > there coincides with two- > party dominance. > > It has been pointed out that, if a particular two parties, > regarded by all voters as the worst > two parties, are perceived (with lots of help from the mass > media) as "the two choices", the > only viable parties, the only winnable parties, then, in > Plurality or IRV, those two parties > will continue winning, at lesser-of-2-evils strategic > equilibrium, forever > (or at least as long as Plurality or IRV continues to be used). > > That Richie was able to make those two statements in _Science_, > and that Richie was able > to publish in _Science_ at all, demonstrates the grotesque and > obscene ability of money > to buy influence, and a perception of authority, respectability > and credibility for the > "executive director" and his "senior analysts". :-) > > Mike Ossipoff > > > > > > > > > > > > > ------------------------------ > > _______________________________________________ > Election-Methods mailing list > [email protected] > http://lists.electorama.com/listinfo.cgi/election-methods- > electorama.com > > End of Election-Methods Digest, Vol 90, Issue 51 > ************************************************ > ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
