I believe the only time FairVote has been published in Science was as a response to an editorial by Steven Brams. Brams also got a chance to respond, and while he didn't refute every one of their distortions (and couldn't refute the empirical predictions which Burlington later proved false), I believe that you can't really fault Science for providing a forum for both sides of the debate. (On both sides, it was editorial content, not subject to peer review.)
Jameson 2011/12/21 <[email protected]> > Mike, > > Right ON! > > But I tripped up for a second on an unintentional typo concerning Richie's > second claim... > > > 2. The article said that the best strategy in Approval is to > > rank the candidates sincerely. > > Replace "Approval" with "IRV" in the above statement: > > Forest > > > From: MIKE OSSIPOFF > > To: > > Subject: [EM] FairVote in _Science_ magazine > > Message-ID: > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" > > > > > > Looking at some back-pages of electology discussion, I was > > reminded of > > Richie's article in _Science_ magazine, published some time ago. > > > > First, it's astonishing that someone like Richie was able to > > publish in _Science_. > > > > But equally astonishing was that he could make the statements > > that he made there, > > and they were published without being checked for accuracy. > > > > The postings pointed out two really silly statements made in the > > article: > > 1. The article said that, according to (unnamed?) experts, > > voters in Approval > > elections will tend to approve only one candidate. > > > > That statement was answered in the electology posting. I'd > > answered it for Richie > > decades ago. > > > > Regarding the very many people who now think that they need to > > vote (in Plurality) for > > the Democrat, and who say that that's necessary as a "pragmatic" > > vote, to > > avoid wasting their vote, and who say that it's necessary to > > "hold your nose" and > > vote for Democrat, though you don't really like her--Richie > > thinks that those > > people are suddenly going to start voting only for their > > favorite? :-)? > > > > No, those hold-their-nose lesser-of-2-evils Democrat voters, if > > we switched to Approval, > > would continue voting for the Democrat in Approval. The > > difference is that, with Approval, > > they can also vote for everyone whom they like better than the > > Democrat. > > Of course, if it turns out, based on the Approval election vote- > > totals, or from > > (newly) honest and relevant polling, that those voters' favorite > > can beat the Republican, > > then of course, at that time, they might very well stop voting > > for the Democrat, and > > might start voting only for one or more candidates whom they > > like better than the > > Democrats. > > > > One thing that Richie doesn't understand is that, if a voter, in > > Approval, votes > > only for hir favorite, that's because s/he feels that hir > > favorite has a win, or > > that s/he doesn't consider anyone else to be acceptable. That's > > not a disadvantage of Approval. > > That's good strategy. Maybe Approval vote totals will soon show > > that progressive, > > better-than-Democrat candidates have a win and that their > > supporters needn't vote for > > a Democrat in Approval. That could result in well-informed, good- > > strategy "plumping", > > "bullet-voting". > > > > But, more likely, people will vote, in Approval, for a set of > > progressives, who are similar, > > and similarly-good candidates. ...unless there's only one that > > they consider acceptable, > > or unless their favorite appears to have a clear win over all > > the others. > > > > Approval strategy, when the election has completely unacceptable > > candidates who could win, > > is to vote for all of the acceptable candidates and for none of > > the unacceptable candidates. > > > > But regarding the person who now holds their nose and votes for > > a Democrat whom s/he doesn't > > like, though s/he likes others more--That person will, in > > Approval, vote for that > > same Democrat, and for everyone whom s/he likes more.? ...until > > Approval's vote totals, > > or genuinely worthwhile polling, show that there's no need to > > vote for the unliked > > Democrat. > > > > 2. The article said that the best strategy in Approval is to > > rank the candidates > > sincerely. > > > > ...and that was published in _Science_ magazine :-) > > > > It's common knowledge that strategy incentive is present in all > > nonprobabilistic voting systems. > > Richie's statement is hardly surprising, coming, as it does, > > from Richie. > > But it's indeed surprising that no one at _Science_ questioned > > the accuracy > > of that statement before publishing it. > > > > But, then, that could be said of statement #1, above, too. > > > > Just as with the other statement, I and others had explained the > > incorrectness of > > that statement to Richie decades ago. > > > > As is common knowledge among everyone who discusses voting > > systems (except for Richie, evidently), > > your needed compromise can be eliminated because s/he didn't > > have your vote yet, when s/he > > needed it, because your vote was on your favorite instead. > > Voting for your favorite instead > > of insincerely voting your compromise in 1st place, has given > > the election to someone who is > > worse than your compromise. How to avoid that? Rank your > > compromise in 1st place, burying > > your favorite. > > > > It's been reported that, when IRV is used in in national > > elections, many voters say that they vote > > for a lesser-of-2-evils compromise in 1st place, burying their > > favorite, so as not to > > "waste [their] vote."? Maybe not coincidentally, the use of IRV > > there coincides with two- > > party dominance. > > > > It has been pointed out that, if a particular two parties, > > regarded by all voters as the worst > > two parties, are perceived (with lots of help from the mass > > media) as "the two choices", the > > only viable parties, the only winnable parties, then, in > > Plurality or IRV, those two parties > > will continue winning, at lesser-of-2-evils strategic > > equilibrium, forever > > (or at least as long as Plurality or IRV continues to be used). > > > > That Richie was able to make those two statements in _Science_, > > and that Richie was able > > to publish in _Science_ at all, demonstrates the grotesque and > > obscene ability of money > > to buy influence, and a perception of authority, respectability > > and credibility for the > > "executive director" and his "senior analysts". :-) > > > > Mike Ossipoff > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > ------------------------------ > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Election-Methods mailing list > > [email protected] > > http://lists.electorama.com/listinfo.cgi/election-methods- > > electorama.com > > > > End of Election-Methods Digest, Vol 90, Issue 51 > > ************************************************ > > > ---- > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info >
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