How can you continue to ignore delegation and sequential assignment (as in SODA) as an FBC-compliant solution to ABE/chicken dilemma? SODA isn't even optimized for this; if for some reason you're unsatisfied with the slight remnants of the chicken dilemma which SODA leaves, you could (at the cost of either complexity or voter freedom) make a system which solves the dilemma 100% instead of just 99.9%.
Jameson 2011/12/27 MIKE OSSIPOFF <[email protected]> > Because of the great desirability of avoiding the ABE problem, it's worth > considering or looking at > all sorts of possible solutions. > > MMPO and MDDTR are known to work fine, though they have vulnerability to > non-valid criticisms. > > The mutuality-requiring methods work fine too, and, though someone here > has made angry noises about them, > he isn't saying anything other than personal opinion, and would be > unlikely to be able to make a public case > against the mutuality-requiring methods. > > Nevertheless, it's always useful to consider other approaches. > > I'd spoken of two approaches to avoiding ABE: > > 1. Counting combined support (even if one-sided) against a candidate. > > 2. Mutuality-requirement > > And now, > > 3. Faction-size (as a ballot option) > > 4. Hypothetical cooperation or noncooperation > > How they'd work: > > 3. Faction-size (as a ballot option): > > In the kind of ABE situation we've been speaking of, the problem would be > solved > if the A voters could indicate on their ballot that their middle-rating > for B is > conditional upon B having at least as many top-ratings as A has. > > Of course sometimes it's necessary to support a compromise with less > favoriteness, > and so this requirement should be optional. > > 4. Hypothetical cooperation or noncooperation: > > This could be automatic or optional. > > There could be a rule that, ballot1's middle rating to a candidate2 who > isn't in > a mutual approval set in common with any of ballot1's top-rated candidates > is counted > only if that candidate2 would outpoll each of ballot1's top-rated > candidates if, for each > candidate1 on ballot 1: > > ...no ballot top-rating candidate2 and not candidate1 gives a > middle-rating to candidate1 > and no ballot top-rating candidate1 and not candidate2 gives a > middle-rating to candidate2. > > [end of tentative, work-in-progress, maybe-useful definition of the > hypothetical noncooperation approach] > > Alternatively, that last paragraph could replace "no ballot" with "every > ballot". That would be > the hypothetical cooperation approach, which probably amounts to the same > thing. > > The above could be applied to all the middle-ratings, based on an initial > assumption that > all middle ratings are counted. Of course, the application of the above > requirements > would likely change the conditions that had caused some middle ratings to > be given or > with-held. It would be simplest to disregard that change. To have the > system re-examine the > noncounting of middle-ratings, and re-apply its requirement, could result > in an unstable > outcome that changes with each re-examination. > > Just using an initial assumption that all middle ratings are counted might > be adequate for > avoiding the ABE problem. It certainly is, in the simple ABE situation > that's been discussed > here. > > ---------------------------- > > I'm not saying that these ABE approaches are as workable or desirable as > approaches #1 and #2. But, > as I said, all possibilities are worth naming, due to the importance of > avoiding the co-operation/ > defection problem. Approach #3 seems simple and workable, and useful for > situations like the > usual ABE. > > Mike Ossipoff > > > > > > > ---- > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info > >
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