JQ, you gotta also recognize that every extra wrinkle you add to a rule to deal with a contrived irregularity makes it disproportionately more difficult to market to the general public.
When you get around to the marketing of SODA, you're going to realize that a lot of FairVote's simplifications of IRV were necessary to streamline the product. dlw On Tue, Jan 10, 2012 at 12:37 PM, < [email protected]> wrote: > Send Election-Methods mailing list submissions to > [email protected] > > To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit > > http://lists.electorama.com/listinfo.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com > > or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to > [email protected] > > You can reach the person managing the list at > [email protected] > > When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific > than "Re: Contents of Election-Methods digest..." > > Today's Topics: > > 1. Re: A problem with IRV3/AV3 (Jameson Quinn) (David L Wetzell) > 2. CLDMM{O ([email protected]) > 3. Re: A problem with IRV3/AV3 (Jameson Quinn) (Jameson Quinn) > 4. SODA: polls via "like/+1/reddit"; resulting nonmonotonicity; > natural fix (Jameson Quinn) > 5. AERLO in conditional voting. Speculations. (MIKE OSSIPOFF) > > > ---------- Forwarded message ---------- > From: David L Wetzell <[email protected]> > To: [email protected] > Cc: > Date: Mon, 9 Jan 2012 14:28:53 -0600 > Subject: Re: [EM] A problem with IRV3/AV3 (Jameson Quinn) > >> ---------- Forwarded message ---------- >> From: Jameson Quinn <[email protected]> >> To: EM <[email protected]> >> Cc: >> Date: Sun, 8 Jan 2012 19:03:29 -0600 >> Subject: [EM] A problem with IRV3/AV3 >> Imagine a scenario of an ABCD one-dimensional continuum: >> >> 41: A>B>C >> 19: B>A>C >> 20: B>C>D >> 20: C>B>D >> >> If the A voters vote A>>D then A will win. By raising the turkey D over >> the true CW B, they have stolen the win. Even if their strategy fails to >> keep B out of the top 3, they lose nothing; B will still win. >> > > thanks for doing this. In the first stage wouldn't B and C tie for 3rd > place if only the first set of voters all voted strategically together in > the same way? They'd both get rankings from 59 of the voters. So if it > came down to a coin-toss, there'd be a 50-50 chance of the CW winning vs > the 2nd place candidate given a massive coordinated strategic vote by only > a subset of the sample (We assume none of the 3rd or 4th set of voters > decide to strategically leave off D rankings)? > >> >> To be honest, it was harder to tune this scenario than I thought it would >> be. Thus, having taken the time to write this down, I am no longer opposed >> to IRV3/AV3. (For IRV2/AV2, it's easier to get this problem. It's also >> easier to get the problem if there are clones involved, but real-world >> clones beyond 3 candidates are unlikely.) >> > > Thank you again. > > The MSM+relevant portion of the Blogosphere shd be helpful in identifying > clones in real world. > >> >> Since I'm now not opposed to IRV3/AV3, I consider it one of the 3 reforms >> (along with SODA and IRV) that would be most acceptable to incumbents, >> because it avoids the weak Condorcet winner problem. >> > > remind me what is the weak Condorcet winner problem? > > >> Still, it is basically just as bad as IRV for nonmonotonicity and >> spoilers; all the spoiler scenarios I consider realistic are essentially >> 3-candidate anyway. As such, I see no reason to believe that it would not >> lead to lesser-evil voting and 2-party domination, as IRV does. Since I see >> 2-party domination (as opposed to just having 2 strongest parties, a >> logical necessity) as a source of the most-serious problems with Plurality, >> I still feel that SODA is a much better option than IRV3/AV3. >> > > dlw: And our difference is that I see the near exclusive use of Plurality > voting rules as the source of my country's current evils, since it's not > hard to imagine 2 party dominated system that is a lot better. All it > takes is for there to be better checks and balances between them and for > there to be two quite different major parties plus scope for > outsiders/dissenters to express themselves via minor parties and LTPs. > > dlw > ps, I'm going to repost this on my blog. > >> >> Jameson >> > > > > ---------- Forwarded message ---------- > From: [email protected] > To: [email protected] > Cc: > Date: Mon, 09 Jan 2012 21:12:04 +0000 (GMT) > Subject: [EM] CLDMM{O > Mike, > > I wonder if it is possible for a CL to win three slot MMPO when the number > of ballots on which X appears > in the bottom slot is counted as an oppsitions to X. > > In other words, I wonder if the CL disqualification is redudant in that > context. > > Also, how does the CLD rule affect the FBC in general? > > Forest > > > > ---------- Forwarded message ---------- > From: Jameson Quinn <[email protected]> > To: David L Wetzell <[email protected]> > Cc: [email protected] > Date: Mon, 9 Jan 2012 18:20:02 -0600 > Subject: Re: [EM] A problem with IRV3/AV3 (Jameson Quinn) > > > 2012/1/9 David L Wetzell <[email protected]> > >> ---------- Forwarded message ---------- >>> From: Jameson Quinn <[email protected]> >>> To: EM <[email protected]> >>> Cc: >>> Date: Sun, 8 Jan 2012 19:03:29 -0600 >>> Subject: [EM] A problem with IRV3/AV3 >>> Imagine a scenario of an ABCD one-dimensional continuum: >>> >>> 41: A>B>C >>> 19: B>A>C >>> 20: B>C>D >>> 20: C>B>D >>> >>> If the A voters vote A>>D then A will win. By raising the turkey D over >>> the true CW B, they have stolen the win. Even if their strategy fails to >>> keep B out of the top 3, they lose nothing; B will still win. >>> >> >> thanks for doing this. In the first stage wouldn't B and C tie for 3rd >> place if only the first set of voters all voted strategically together in >> the same way? >> > Right, though of course it would be easy to fix that by changing some > fraction of the B>A>C voters to B>A. > > >> They'd both get rankings from 59 of the voters. So if it came down >> to a coin-toss, there'd be a 50-50 chance of the CW winning vs the 2nd >> place candidate given a massive coordinated strategic vote by only a subset >> of the sample (We assume none of the 3rd or 4th set of voters decide to >> strategically leave off D rankings)? >> >>> >>> To be honest, it was harder to tune this scenario than I thought it >>> would be. Thus, having taken the time to write this down, I am no longer >>> opposed to IRV3/AV3. (For IRV2/AV2, it's easier to get this problem. It's >>> also easier to get the problem if there are clones involved, but real-world >>> clones beyond 3 candidates are unlikely.) >>> >> >> Thank you again. >> >> The MSM+relevant portion of the Blogosphere shd be helpful in identifying >> clones in real world. >> >>> >>> Since I'm now not opposed to IRV3/AV3, I consider it one of the 3 >>> reforms (along with SODA and IRV) that would be most acceptable to >>> incumbents, because it avoids the weak Condorcet winner problem. >>> >> >> remind me what is the weak Condorcet winner problem? >> > > A polarized electorate, 49% A, 49%B. 2% support an unknown centrist X. > Now, 25% each from A and B decide, "X couldn't possibly be worse than the > other side", so add a second choice, without really looking into whether X > really is better or worse. Most systems would then make X win, even if they > would be crushed by either in an actual runoff where the voters actually > took a serious look at them. > > >> >> >>> Still, it is basically just as bad as IRV for nonmonotonicity and >>> spoilers; all the spoiler scenarios I consider realistic are essentially >>> 3-candidate anyway. As such, I see no reason to believe that it would not >>> lead to lesser-evil voting and 2-party domination, as IRV does. Since I see >>> 2-party domination (as opposed to just having 2 strongest parties, a >>> logical necessity) as a source of the most-serious problems with Plurality, >>> I still feel that SODA is a much better option than IRV3/AV3. >>> >> >> dlw: And our difference is that I see the near exclusive use of Plurality >> voting rules as the source of my country's current evils, since it's not >> hard to imagine 2 party dominated system that is a lot better. All it >> takes is for there to be better checks and balances between them and for >> there to be two quite different major parties plus scope for >> outsiders/dissenters to express themselves via minor parties and LTPs. >> >> dlw >> ps, I'm going to repost this on my blog. >> >>> >>> Jameson >>> >> >> >> ---- >> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list >> info >> >> > > > ---------- Forwarded message ---------- > From: Jameson Quinn <[email protected]> > To: EM <[email protected]> > Cc: > Date: Tue, 10 Jan 2012 11:59:05 -0600 > Subject: [EM] SODA: polls via "like/+1/reddit"; resulting nonmonotonicity; > natural fix > I'm designing a SODA poll that would use facebook "like", google+ "+1", > and/or reddit upvotes, along with automated delegated vote assignment, to > give live-updated results. In thinking about this, I've realized that SODA > can be nonmonotonic in the following (highly contrived) scenario: > > (delegated preferences in parentheses) > > 35: A(>C) > 30: B > 25: C > 10-n: X > n: Y(>B>A) > > With n=4, A wins. With n=6, Y's votes are enough to make B win, so A > approves C to prevent that from happening, and C wins; a worse result from > the perspective of the Y voters. > > The natural fix is to allow A to approve C with only some of their > delegated votes. Then, when n=6, A can approve C with 12 votes. Now Y's > votes cannot make B win, so Y approves A, and the nonmonotonicity is gone. > > Of course, in order for this to work like that in a live poll, I have to > make the logic for automatically updating assigned approvals much, much > more complex. In fact, off the top of my head, I can't even prove that the > general problem isn't NP-hard. But in real life, it's very unlikely that > the scenario would be even this complex, so I'm not too worried about that. > > Jameson > > > ---------- Forwarded message ---------- > From: MIKE OSSIPOFF <[email protected]> > To: <[email protected]> > Cc: > Date: Tue, 10 Jan 2012 18:37:00 +0000 > Subject: [EM] AERLO in conditional voting. Speculations. > I want to emphasize the distinction between speculations and proposals. > > AOC, MTAOC, MCAOC, AOCBucklin, and their automatic > (non-optional)-conditionality versions > AC, MTAC, MCAC and ACBucklin are proposals, not speculations. > > I prefer the optional-conditionality versions to the > automatic-conditionality versions. > > Because the conditional voting methods are offered as optional, offering > those ways of using one's > Approval vote as voting options in the Approval election doesn't wrong > anyone who doesn't choose > to use them. > > I sometimes mention speculations too. I'll mention a few at the end of > this post. > > AERLO in conditional voting: > > 1. Obviously, if you want your middle rating for a candidate to be > conditional, then you certainly wouldn't > want to give hir unconditional AERLO status. So, plainly, if a ballot > marks an above-AERLO candidate > as "(conditional)", the AERLO status should only apply if the candidate > qualifies for receiving your > conditional middle rating. > > 2. I suggested that the default assumption for designation of > coalition-suitable candidates should > be "Above AERLO (or top-rated or top-ranked if the ballot doesn't use > AERLO)". > > But, for use in conditional voting, I suggest, for that default > assumption, two additional requirements > for a coalition-suitable candidate: > > a) must not be a conditionally-rated candidate > > b) must be ranked over the candidate being considered for actually > receiving the conditional vote listed > for hir on the ballot. > > I mentioned that, in MTA or MCA, when AERLO is used, a ballot's > middle-rated candidates could be > listed vertically, as a ranking, for AERLO purposes, even though they're > all middle-rated. That > qualifies as the ranking referred to in b). > > 3. Though I wouldn't unilaterally suggest it, AERLO could fairly be > automatic at the bottom of any > ranking that doesn't choose AERLO. > > After all, you like all of your ranked candidates better than any of your > unranked ones. So, in the event > that none of your ranked candidates wins, it could only be beneficial to > you to move them all up to > 1st place, for a 2nd count. That could only be beneficial. > > Still, it amounts to changing someone's ranking without their permission. > Based on that principle, > and wanting to offer AERLO as an _option_, my inclination is to not make > AERLO automatic > at the end of ballots that don't specify use of AERLO. If others advocated > that, then sure. But > I wouldn't unilaterally suggest any automatic, non-optional application of > AERLO, or any > other non-optional modifications of a voted ballot. > > A speculation, regarding #1, above: > > Maybe, for top rating, there could and should be a stronger mutuality > requirement, a top-mutuality > requirement, before moving the conditional, but above-AERLO, candidate to > top, but I haven't > looked at if, or how, that could work. It's a speculation. I emphasize > that I don't suggest that complication for the > poll. And, for public proposals, that would be a _later_ proposal. If such > a requirement were workable > and desirable, it could be implemented exactly as conditional middle > ratings are dealt with in MTAOC. > > Some FBC/ABE Condorcet-like rank method speculations: > > I mentioned that maybe Condorcet could be modified for FBC/ABE methods. > Before that, of course Kevin's > tied-at-top pairwise comparisons had been suggested for use in such > methods. > > Yesterday I suggested MMPO, but with an initial disqualification of > Condorcet losers. But that wouldn't avoid > Kevin's bad-example, because we could add a Candidate D, whom no one > ranks. C pairwise pair-beats hir, and > so isn't Condorcet loser. > > Maybe Condorcet (Tied-At-Top), MMPO2 is more promising. I don't know if it > would have the desired > properties. It's only a speculation at this point. > > Other such speculations: > > 1. MinMax Tied-at-Top pairwise defeat? A Tied-at-Top counterpart to MMPO. > > Of course I mean that its pairwise comparisons would be Kevin's > tied-at-top pairwise comparisons. > > 2. Greatest Tied-at-Top pairwise win? > > 3. Condorcet(Tied-at-Top), Top. Among the candidates who don't have a > tied-at-top pairwise defeat, elect the one > who has the most top ratings. > > I haven't examined those speculations. > > Mike Ossipoff > > > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > Election-Methods mailing list > [email protected] > http://lists.electorama.com/listinfo.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com > >
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