2012/1/10 David L Wetzell <[email protected]> > JQ, you gotta also recognize that every extra wrinkle you add to a rule to > deal with a contrived irregularity makes it disproportionately more > difficult to market to the general public.
Yeah, I'm not actually going to add the partial-assignment fix to the official rules for SODA. In the unlikely event that the nonmonotonicity occurred (something which requires a careful balance of 1 minor and 3 major candidates, and can't happen unless only one of the 3 majors expresses a preference between the other two), it wouldn't be too obvious, and it would only "harm" a small minority of voters. The issue only came up in the context of a live, auto-delegation-assignment web poll; in that case, with one vote added at a time, nonmonotonicity would be an obvious blemish. (The other reason I mentioned the fix is to show how natural it is. In a real sense, it is the nonmonotonicity which is not natural to SODA, only a factor of the simplified rules.) Jameson > > When you get around to the marketing of SODA, you're going to realize that > a lot of FairVote's simplifications of IRV were necessary to streamline the > product. > > dlw > > On Tue, Jan 10, 2012 at 12:37 PM, < > [email protected]> wrote: > >> Send Election-Methods mailing list submissions to >> [email protected] >> >> To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit >> >> http://lists.electorama.com/listinfo.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com >> >> or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to >> [email protected] >> >> You can reach the person managing the list at >> [email protected] >> >> When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific >> than "Re: Contents of Election-Methods digest..." >> >> Today's Topics: >> >> 1. Re: A problem with IRV3/AV3 (Jameson Quinn) (David L Wetzell) >> 2. CLDMM{O ([email protected]) >> 3. Re: A problem with IRV3/AV3 (Jameson Quinn) (Jameson Quinn) >> 4. SODA: polls via "like/+1/reddit"; resulting nonmonotonicity; >> natural fix (Jameson Quinn) >> 5. AERLO in conditional voting. Speculations. (MIKE OSSIPOFF) >> >> >> ---------- Forwarded message ---------- >> From: David L Wetzell <[email protected]> >> To: [email protected] >> Cc: >> Date: Mon, 9 Jan 2012 14:28:53 -0600 >> Subject: Re: [EM] A problem with IRV3/AV3 (Jameson Quinn) >> >>> ---------- Forwarded message ---------- >>> From: Jameson Quinn <[email protected]> >>> To: EM <[email protected]> >>> Cc: >>> Date: Sun, 8 Jan 2012 19:03:29 -0600 >>> Subject: [EM] A problem with IRV3/AV3 >>> Imagine a scenario of an ABCD one-dimensional continuum: >>> >>> 41: A>B>C >>> 19: B>A>C >>> 20: B>C>D >>> 20: C>B>D >>> >>> If the A voters vote A>>D then A will win. By raising the turkey D over >>> the true CW B, they have stolen the win. Even if their strategy fails to >>> keep B out of the top 3, they lose nothing; B will still win. >>> >> >> thanks for doing this. In the first stage wouldn't B and C tie for 3rd >> place if only the first set of voters all voted strategically together in >> the same way? They'd both get rankings from 59 of the voters. So if it >> came down to a coin-toss, there'd be a 50-50 chance of the CW winning vs >> the 2nd place candidate given a massive coordinated strategic vote by only >> a subset of the sample (We assume none of the 3rd or 4th set of voters >> decide to strategically leave off D rankings)? >> >>> >>> To be honest, it was harder to tune this scenario than I thought it >>> would be. Thus, having taken the time to write this down, I am no longer >>> opposed to IRV3/AV3. (For IRV2/AV2, it's easier to get this problem. It's >>> also easier to get the problem if there are clones involved, but real-world >>> clones beyond 3 candidates are unlikely.) >>> >> >> Thank you again. >> >> The MSM+relevant portion of the Blogosphere shd be helpful in identifying >> clones in real world. >> >>> >>> Since I'm now not opposed to IRV3/AV3, I consider it one of the 3 >>> reforms (along with SODA and IRV) that would be most acceptable to >>> incumbents, because it avoids the weak Condorcet winner problem. >>> >> >> remind me what is the weak Condorcet winner problem? >> >> >>> Still, it is basically just as bad as IRV for nonmonotonicity and >>> spoilers; all the spoiler scenarios I consider realistic are essentially >>> 3-candidate anyway. As such, I see no reason to believe that it would not >>> lead to lesser-evil voting and 2-party domination, as IRV does. Since I see >>> 2-party domination (as opposed to just having 2 strongest parties, a >>> logical necessity) as a source of the most-serious problems with Plurality, >>> I still feel that SODA is a much better option than IRV3/AV3. >>> >> >> dlw: And our difference is that I see the near exclusive use of Plurality >> voting rules as the source of my country's current evils, since it's not >> hard to imagine 2 party dominated system that is a lot better. All it >> takes is for there to be better checks and balances between them and for >> there to be two quite different major parties plus scope for >> outsiders/dissenters to express themselves via minor parties and LTPs. >> >> dlw >> ps, I'm going to repost this on my blog. >> >>> >>> Jameson >>> >> >> >> >> ---------- Forwarded message ---------- >> From: [email protected] >> To: [email protected] >> Cc: >> Date: Mon, 09 Jan 2012 21:12:04 +0000 (GMT) >> Subject: [EM] CLDMM{O >> Mike, >> >> I wonder if it is possible for a CL to win three slot MMPO when the >> number of ballots on which X appears >> in the bottom slot is counted as an oppsitions to X. >> >> In other words, I wonder if the CL disqualification is redudant in that >> context. >> >> Also, how does the CLD rule affect the FBC in general? >> >> Forest >> >> >> >> ---------- Forwarded message ---------- >> From: Jameson Quinn <[email protected]> >> To: David L Wetzell <[email protected]> >> Cc: [email protected] >> Date: Mon, 9 Jan 2012 18:20:02 -0600 >> Subject: Re: [EM] A problem with IRV3/AV3 (Jameson Quinn) >> >> >> 2012/1/9 David L Wetzell <[email protected]> >> >>> ---------- Forwarded message ---------- >>>> From: Jameson Quinn <[email protected]> >>>> To: EM <[email protected]> >>>> Cc: >>>> Date: Sun, 8 Jan 2012 19:03:29 -0600 >>>> Subject: [EM] A problem with IRV3/AV3 >>>> Imagine a scenario of an ABCD one-dimensional continuum: >>>> >>>> 41: A>B>C >>>> 19: B>A>C >>>> 20: B>C>D >>>> 20: C>B>D >>>> >>>> If the A voters vote A>>D then A will win. By raising the turkey D over >>>> the true CW B, they have stolen the win. Even if their strategy fails to >>>> keep B out of the top 3, they lose nothing; B will still win. >>>> >>> >>> thanks for doing this. In the first stage wouldn't B and C tie for 3rd >>> place if only the first set of voters all voted strategically together in >>> the same way? >>> >> Right, though of course it would be easy to fix that by changing some >> fraction of the B>A>C voters to B>A. >> >> >>> They'd both get rankings from 59 of the voters. So if it came down >>> to a coin-toss, there'd be a 50-50 chance of the CW winning vs the 2nd >>> place candidate given a massive coordinated strategic vote by only a subset >>> of the sample (We assume none of the 3rd or 4th set of voters decide to >>> strategically leave off D rankings)? >>> >>>> >>>> To be honest, it was harder to tune this scenario than I thought it >>>> would be. Thus, having taken the time to write this down, I am no longer >>>> opposed to IRV3/AV3. (For IRV2/AV2, it's easier to get this problem. It's >>>> also easier to get the problem if there are clones involved, but real-world >>>> clones beyond 3 candidates are unlikely.) >>>> >>> >>> Thank you again. >>> >>> The MSM+relevant portion of the Blogosphere shd be helpful in >>> identifying clones in real world. >>> >>>> >>>> Since I'm now not opposed to IRV3/AV3, I consider it one of the 3 >>>> reforms (along with SODA and IRV) that would be most acceptable to >>>> incumbents, because it avoids the weak Condorcet winner problem. >>>> >>> >>> remind me what is the weak Condorcet winner problem? >>> >> >> A polarized electorate, 49% A, 49%B. 2% support an unknown centrist X. >> Now, 25% each from A and B decide, "X couldn't possibly be worse than the >> other side", so add a second choice, without really looking into whether X >> really is better or worse. Most systems would then make X win, even if they >> would be crushed by either in an actual runoff where the voters actually >> took a serious look at them. >> >> >>> >>> >>>> Still, it is basically just as bad as IRV for nonmonotonicity and >>>> spoilers; all the spoiler scenarios I consider realistic are essentially >>>> 3-candidate anyway. As such, I see no reason to believe that it would not >>>> lead to lesser-evil voting and 2-party domination, as IRV does. Since I see >>>> 2-party domination (as opposed to just having 2 strongest parties, a >>>> logical necessity) as a source of the most-serious problems with Plurality, >>>> I still feel that SODA is a much better option than IRV3/AV3. >>>> >>> >>> dlw: And our difference is that I see the near exclusive use of >>> Plurality voting rules as the source of my country's current evils, since >>> it's not hard to imagine 2 party dominated system that is a lot better. >>> All it takes is for there to be better checks and balances between them >>> and for there to be two quite different major parties plus scope for >>> outsiders/dissenters to express themselves via minor parties and LTPs. >>> >>> dlw >>> ps, I'm going to repost this on my blog. >>> >>>> >>>> Jameson >>>> >>> >>> >>> ---- >>> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list >>> info >>> >>> >> >> >> ---------- Forwarded message ---------- >> From: Jameson Quinn <[email protected]> >> To: EM <[email protected]> >> Cc: >> Date: Tue, 10 Jan 2012 11:59:05 -0600 >> Subject: [EM] SODA: polls via "like/+1/reddit"; resulting >> nonmonotonicity; natural fix >> I'm designing a SODA poll that would use facebook "like", google+ "+1", >> and/or reddit upvotes, along with automated delegated vote assignment, to >> give live-updated results. In thinking about this, I've realized that SODA >> can be nonmonotonic in the following (highly contrived) scenario: >> >> (delegated preferences in parentheses) >> >> 35: A(>C) >> 30: B >> 25: C >> 10-n: X >> n: Y(>B>A) >> >> With n=4, A wins. With n=6, Y's votes are enough to make B win, so A >> approves C to prevent that from happening, and C wins; a worse result from >> the perspective of the Y voters. >> >> The natural fix is to allow A to approve C with only some of their >> delegated votes. Then, when n=6, A can approve C with 12 votes. Now Y's >> votes cannot make B win, so Y approves A, and the nonmonotonicity is gone. >> >> Of course, in order for this to work like that in a live poll, I have to >> make the logic for automatically updating assigned approvals much, much >> more complex. In fact, off the top of my head, I can't even prove that the >> general problem isn't NP-hard. But in real life, it's very unlikely that >> the scenario would be even this complex, so I'm not too worried about that. >> >> Jameson >> >> >> ---------- Forwarded message ---------- >> From: MIKE OSSIPOFF <[email protected]> >> To: <[email protected]> >> Cc: >> Date: Tue, 10 Jan 2012 18:37:00 +0000 >> Subject: [EM] AERLO in conditional voting. Speculations. >> I want to emphasize the distinction between speculations and proposals. >> >> AOC, MTAOC, MCAOC, AOCBucklin, and their automatic >> (non-optional)-conditionality versions >> AC, MTAC, MCAC and ACBucklin are proposals, not speculations. >> >> I prefer the optional-conditionality versions to the >> automatic-conditionality versions. >> >> Because the conditional voting methods are offered as optional, offering >> those ways of using one's >> Approval vote as voting options in the Approval election doesn't wrong >> anyone who doesn't choose >> to use them. >> >> I sometimes mention speculations too. I'll mention a few at the end of >> this post. >> >> AERLO in conditional voting: >> >> 1. Obviously, if you want your middle rating for a candidate to be >> conditional, then you certainly wouldn't >> want to give hir unconditional AERLO status. So, plainly, if a ballot >> marks an above-AERLO candidate >> as "(conditional)", the AERLO status should only apply if the candidate >> qualifies for receiving your >> conditional middle rating. >> >> 2. I suggested that the default assumption for designation of >> coalition-suitable candidates should >> be "Above AERLO (or top-rated or top-ranked if the ballot doesn't use >> AERLO)". >> >> But, for use in conditional voting, I suggest, for that default >> assumption, two additional requirements >> for a coalition-suitable candidate: >> >> a) must not be a conditionally-rated candidate >> >> b) must be ranked over the candidate being considered for actually >> receiving the conditional vote listed >> for hir on the ballot. >> >> I mentioned that, in MTA or MCA, when AERLO is used, a ballot's >> middle-rated candidates could be >> listed vertically, as a ranking, for AERLO purposes, even though they're >> all middle-rated. That >> qualifies as the ranking referred to in b). >> >> 3. Though I wouldn't unilaterally suggest it, AERLO could fairly be >> automatic at the bottom of any >> ranking that doesn't choose AERLO. >> >> After all, you like all of your ranked candidates better than any of your >> unranked ones. So, in the event >> that none of your ranked candidates wins, it could only be beneficial to >> you to move them all up to >> 1st place, for a 2nd count. That could only be beneficial. >> >> Still, it amounts to changing someone's ranking without their permission. >> Based on that principle, >> and wanting to offer AERLO as an _option_, my inclination is to not make >> AERLO automatic >> at the end of ballots that don't specify use of AERLO. If others >> advocated that, then sure. But >> I wouldn't unilaterally suggest any automatic, non-optional application >> of AERLO, or any >> other non-optional modifications of a voted ballot. >> >> A speculation, regarding #1, above: >> >> Maybe, for top rating, there could and should be a stronger mutuality >> requirement, a top-mutuality >> requirement, before moving the conditional, but above-AERLO, candidate to >> top, but I haven't >> looked at if, or how, that could work. It's a speculation. I emphasize >> that I don't suggest that complication for the >> poll. And, for public proposals, that would be a _later_ proposal. If >> such a requirement were workable >> and desirable, it could be implemented exactly as conditional middle >> ratings are dealt with in MTAOC. >> >> Some FBC/ABE Condorcet-like rank method speculations: >> >> I mentioned that maybe Condorcet could be modified for FBC/ABE methods. >> Before that, of course Kevin's >> tied-at-top pairwise comparisons had been suggested for use in such >> methods. >> >> Yesterday I suggested MMPO, but with an initial disqualification of >> Condorcet losers. But that wouldn't avoid >> Kevin's bad-example, because we could add a Candidate D, whom no one >> ranks. C pairwise pair-beats hir, and >> so isn't Condorcet loser. >> >> Maybe Condorcet (Tied-At-Top), MMPO2 is more promising. I don't know if >> it would have the desired >> properties. It's only a speculation at this point. >> >> Other such speculations: >> >> 1. MinMax Tied-at-Top pairwise defeat? A Tied-at-Top counterpart to MMPO. >> >> Of course I mean that its pairwise comparisons would be Kevin's >> tied-at-top pairwise comparisons. >> >> 2. Greatest Tied-at-Top pairwise win? >> >> 3. Condorcet(Tied-at-Top), Top. Among the candidates who don't have a >> tied-at-top pairwise defeat, elect the one >> who has the most top ratings. >> >> I haven't examined those speculations. >> >> Mike Ossipoff >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Election-Methods mailing list >> [email protected] >> http://lists.electorama.com/listinfo.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com >> >> > > ---- > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info > >
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