OK, so I'm seeing this as a nice, simple method with good properties. Technically, I'd call it: MiniMax (Pairwise Opposition or Disapproval). But MMPOD is not a name you can use to market a method, and I think this one is good enough to merit branding.
Smallest Focused Opposition Group? (You could claim that either "we all like X better" or "we all hate you" both count as focused opposition)... the acronym is very San Francisco. ... it's hard to say "minimax" without confusing people... Smallest Coherent Opposition? (Same logic) SCO... I could live with that, it's at least pronounceable. Any other ideas? Jameson 2012/1/10 <[email protected]> > Mike, > > Here's why I think that the CLD part is not necessary when we limit MMPO > to three slots: > > The most likely situation where the CL wins is the case in which there is > a clone cycle of three > candidates that generate a lot of opposition among themselves, more > opposition than any of them > generate against the CL. > > When we limit to two slots of approval (and two or fewer slots of > disapproval) then there can be no clone > cycle, assuming that clones are mostly approved together or disapproved > together. > > So that basically takes care of the CL problem. > > AS for Kevin's bad example, I have suggested including the disapprovals as > oppositions as well as > symmetric completion at the bottom. Either of these by itself will solve > the problem, but I think that the > disapproval idea is easier to sell than explaining why we want symmetric > completion at the bottom . but > not at the top. > > 49 C > 03 A > 24 A>B > 24 B (>A?) > > With the disapprovals included (along the diagonal) with the other > pairwise oppositions we get > > Oppositions to A are [ 73, 24, 49] > Oppositions to B are [ 27, 52, 49] > Oppositions to C are [ 27, 48, 51], > > so C wins. But if the B supporters give as much support to A as the A > supporters have given to B, then > the 73 disapproval opposition reduces to 49 and A wins with room to spare > (a one percent margin). > > It also solves the other Kevin bad example > > 49 A > 01 A=C > 01 B=C > 49 B > > The disapproval opposition to C is 98, which makes C the MMPO loser when > we include disapproval as > an opposition, i.s. as the opposition of the "approval cutoff" ideal > candidate/level of acceptance. > > What do you think? > > Forest > > > > > > From: MIKE OSSIPOFF > > To: > > Subject: [EM] CLDMMPO > > > > Forest-- > > > > You wrote: > > > > I wonder if it is possible for a CL to win three slot MMPO when > > the number of ballots on which X appears > > in the bottom slot is counted as an oppsitions to X. > > > > In other words, I wonder if the CL disqualification is redudant > > in that context. > > > > Also, how does the CLD rule affect the FBC in general? > > > > [endquote] > > > > I too have been concerned that FBC compliance could be affected > > by CLD, or the other > > disqualification and completion proposals that I've > > speculatively suggested. > > > > I suggest that when one method is completed by another, or when > > there are > > disqualifications, the "," relation should be used instead of > > the "//" relation. > > > > So, when applying the 2nd method--the completion method, or the > > method used after > > the disqualifications--the entire initial set of candidates > > would be used in > > calculating the scores for the completion or post- > > disqualification method, even > > though that method is applied only to the post-disqualification > > candidates. > > Doesn't that do a lot to protect FBC compliance. > > > > I found that CLDMMPO wouldn't avoid Kevin's MMPO bad-example (I > > mentioned that in > > my other post today). But, as Ted suggested, maybe 3-slot > > methods can avoid many > > of the problems that can happen with unlimited-ranking methods. > > So that's another > > thing to investigate. Might 3-slot MMPO be easier to protect > > from Kevin's > > bad-example? Is there some easy way to achieve that? > > > > Mike Ossipoff > ---- > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info >
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