MJ strategy is: >From polls and past elections, estimate the range of possible median scores of whoever wins this election. For instance, if you can vote A+, A, B, C, D, or F, then you might estimate that the winner will be between B+ and C-. Then, vote anyone you want to win above this range, anyone you want to lose below this, and anyone non-viable honestly.
Obviously, if everyone follows this strategy, then there will be inflation, and eventually everyone will have to vote at the extremes. But it only takes a relatively small fraction of non-strategic voters to stop the strategic inflation in one or both directions. In fact, I believe that for the large majority of voters in real elections, a perfectly honest vote will be strategically optimal. Jameson 2012/1/30 MIKE OSSIPOFF <[email protected]> > > Does anyone here know the strategy of MJ? Does anyone here know what valid > strategic claims can be made for it? How would one maximize one’s utility > in an election with acceptable and completely unacceptable candidates who > could win? How about in an election without completely unacceptable > candidates who could win? > > And no, I don't mean refer to a website. The question is do YOU, as an MJ > advocate, know what MJ's strategy is? > > Of course, if anyone here advocates MJ, then they, themselves, should know > MJ’s strategy, and its advantages and disadvantages, and be able to state > them here. > > I’m just guessing, but isn’t MJ’s strategy the same as that of RV? > (Maximum rating for candidates you’d vote for in Approval, and minimum > points for candidates you wouldn’t vote for in Approval). > > And surely the u/a strategy of MJ is to max-rate the acceptables and > min-rate the unacceptables. > > But of course MJ differs from RV in the following way: In RV, if you rate > x higher than y, you’re reliably, unquestionably, helping x against y. In > MJ, of course that isn’t so. In fact, if you like x and y highly, and at > all similarly, and rate sincerely, then you’re unlikely to help one against > the other, at all. > > Another difference is that, in MJ, even if you correctly guess that you’re > raising a candidate’s median, you can’t know by how much. > > Suppose x is your favorite. y is almost as good. Say the rating range is > 0-100. You sincerely give 100 to x, and 90 to y. > MJ is not rated on a numeric scale, at least, not unless that same numeric scale is used for academic grades in that area (such as the 5-10 scale in Mexico). > > Say I prefer y to x, and, as do you, I consider their merit about the > same. If I rated sincerely, I’d give y 100 and x 90. > > But, unlike you, I don’t vote sincerely. Because x is a rival to y, and > maybe also because I expect you to rate sincerely, I take advantage of your > sincerity by giving y 100, and giving x zero. > > Because different people have different favorites and near-favorites, your > high rating of x and y is probably above those candidates’ median ratings. > So you’re raising the medians of both candidates, with no particular reason > to believe that you’re raising one’s median more than that of the other. > > In our above-described example, that’s what you’re doing: Raising the > medians of x and y. Probably by about the same amount. I, however, am > raising y's median and lowering x's median. You’re raising my candidate’s > median, and I’m lowering your candidate’s median. You aren’t helping x > against y. I’m helping y against x. > > You’ve been had. > You can do exactly the same thing in range: vote Y 100 and X 0. > > At least in RV, you’d have reliably somewhat helped x against y. > The exact same strategic dilemma applies, with the exact same outcome. > > There's something familiar about that strategy situation :-) MJ fully has > the co-operation/defection problem. > Yes. But at least you can afford to vote honestly until you hit that dilemma; and so the habit might carry over. > > Discussion of a method’s strategy shouldn’t have to come from someone who > doesn’t advocate that method. > Although I am a SODA advocate first, I consider myself an MJ advocate as well. And I have mentioned countless times that it is subject to the chicken dilemma. > > A tip: Don’t have confidence in a method whose advocates evidently don’t > know its strategy. > A tip:... oh, forget it, I don't want to be that snarky. > > Another thing: Just as one example, try MJ on the Approval bad-example. > What you thereby find out is that, to be usable, MJ needs bylaws and > patches, such as to make it too wordy and elaborate (and arbitrary?) to be > publicly proposable. > As I've repeatedly said, MJ does not resolve that problem, except insofar as voters' good habits of honest voting carry over. Jameson > > Mike Ossipoff > > > > > ---- > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info > >
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