Hi Jameson,
I expect that unpredictability (whatever there may be) of candidates' decisions
can only hurt criteria compliance.
At least with criteria that are generally defined on votes, because with such
criteria you usually have to assume
the worst about any other influences incorporated into the method.
So I wonder, can you suggest a deterministic version of SODA, where the
"negotiations" of SODA are instead
calculated directly from the pre-announced preferences of the candidates? And
if so, does it satisfy the same
criteria in your view?
I can say I would be skeptical of how a criterion is being applied, or how
clearly it is being defined, if the
satisfaction of it *depends* on the fact that candidates have post-voting
decisions to make.
Kevin
De : Jameson Quinn <[email protected]>
À : EM <[email protected]>
Envoyé le : Mardi 31 janvier 2012 20h50
Objet : [EM] SODA criteria
SODA passes:
Majority
MMC (as voted)
Condorcet (as voted, and in a strong Nash equilibrium as honest)
Condorcet loser (ditto)
Monotone
Participation (with the fix that delegation can be any fraction)
IIA (delegated version - that is, if a new candidate is added, the winner is
either the same, or someone higher on the new candidate's delegation order.)
Cloneproof
Polytime (there is no guarantee that optimal delegated assignment strategy is
polytime calculable, but it will be in any real case, and anyway, candidates
can just choose some near-optimal strategy.)
Resolvable
Summable
Allows equal rankings
FBC
So, of the criteria in the wikipedia voting systems table, the only ones it
out-and-out fails are:
Consistency (though it comes damn close)
Later-no-harm and later-no-help (though it does satisfy LNHarm for the one
(two????) candidate(s?) with the most voted approvals, and for other
candidates, adding later preferences is probably strategically forced; so I'd
say it fulfills the spirit of both of these. Similarly, it satisfies LNHelp for
the last-to-delegate candidate, and nearly so for other late-delegating
candidates, and the point of LNHelp is to prevent a weak candidate from winning
through clever bottom filling, so again it satisfies the spirit.)
Allows later preferences (though delegation substitutes for this affordance in
some cases.)
If we could just get some wikipedia-notable mention of SODA, we could put it in
the table, and I think it would graphically stand out as the most
criteria-compliant method there.
I'm working on an academic article on SODA, which would not be focused on these
criteria or even on SODA, but would quickly state the above. But if anyone can
make an article happen in a wikipedia "reliable source", that would be great.
Jameson
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