2012/2/2 Kevin Venzke <[email protected]> > Hi Jameson, > > > *De :* Jameson Quinn <[email protected]> > *À :* Kevin Venzke <[email protected]> > *Cc :* em <[email protected]> > *Envoyé le :* Mercredi 1 février 2012 18h35 > > *Objet :* Re: [EM] SODA criteria > > > > > In > your criteria list you had "Majority" but for that you must actually be > assuming the opposite of what I am trying, namely that > *everyone* is delegating, is that right? > > > Everyone who votes for the majority candidate is either delegating to > them, or voting them above all other alternatives - that is, approving only > them but checking "do not delegate". This is the standard meaning of the > majority criterion. For instance, by this meaning, approval meets the > majority criterion. > > For MMC, everyone in the mutual majority is either delegating to one of > the candidates, or approving all of them and nobody else. > > > Oh, I missed that the voter can't rank at all. So you are good with FBC. > But I don't regard Approval as satisfying what I > call MF and Woodall's Majority. It's possible to say it satisfies MF, but > I prefer Woodall's treatment. >
I don't know what MF stands for. I agree that it fails Woodall's majority, though not in the unique strong Nash equilibrium. > (The criteria framework > I use doesn't have any way to say that Approval satisfies MMC. You can > equate approval with equal-top, above-bottom, or > call it something external, but I can't say that voters stick to a limited > number of slots. I understand the meaning of "two-slot > MMC" or "voted MMC" but I see these as inferior versions.) > "voted", because delegation means there's sometimes effectively more than two slots. > > In response to your last line, if the majority set involves more than one > candidate, the delegating voters are never part of it > and are unnecessary in getting one of these candidates elected. (I'm using > your treatment that voters only have two rank > levels.) If you don't agree, I'd like to hear how you are interpreting > MMC, because I can't think of how else it would work. > 10: A(>B>C>?...) 10: B(>C>A>?...) 10: C(>A>B>?...) 21: ABC 49: ???? One of A, B, or C must win. Jameson > > Kevin > > ---- > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info > >
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