2012/2/2 MIKE OSSIPOFF <[email protected]> > > MJ: > > Thanks for all the answers about MJ strategy. > > But I'd told how easily a strategic faction can take advantage of and beat > a sincere-voting faction. >
Not to my satisfaction. > > And, if the contest is close, then even a small difference in sincerity > could decide which faction's candidate wins. > > And that amounts to a co-operatioin/defection problem too. > > No amount of speculation or discussion of MJ's other strategy issues or > mystique will make that go away. > > Thanks, Kristofer, for confirming my conjecture: MJ strategy is like RV > strategy. > > This is for sure: In a u/a election, MJ's strategy is the same as that of > RV: Max-rate the acceptables and > min-rate the unacceptables. > This is not true. If sending a message about the relative value within either group is worth more than a thousand times less than winning the election, the rational strategy is to use the top two and the bottom two ratings. > > I conjecture that, in a non-u/a, 0-info election, MJ's strategy is > likewise identical to that of RV: Max-rate the > above-mean candidates and min-rate the below-mean candidates. > As above. > > I further conjecture that all MJ strategy, u/a and non-u/a, 0-info and not > 0-info, is the same as that of RV: > As above. > Max-rate all of the candidates whose merit, for you, is above your > expectation for the election. Min-rate all of > the candidates whose merit, for you, is below your expectation for the > election. > > Of course many Approval strategies have been discussed at EM, but they all > are instances, special cases, of the > above-stated better-than-expectation strategy. > > Condorcet: > > Condorcet is almost fine if you don't care about FBC or the > co-operation/defection problem. > > I've already told why I consider FBC and CD to be important. There's no > need to repeat that now. > > I've been saying that, when advocating a criterion, one should say why one > considers it important. I've amply done > that, regarding FBC and CD. > > So, if you advocate Condorcet, it's because we agree to disagree about FBC > and CD. > > Above, I said "almost fine". That's because, even aside from FBC and CD, > Condorcet doesn't work as well as I'd > formerly believed. My claims about Condorcet's powerful thwarting and > deterence of burial strategy were all based on > 3-candidate examples. > > Just as we all have been in denial about the co-operation/defection > problem, maybe I and some others hadn't wanted > to look at what can happen when there are more than 3 candidates in > Condorcet. > > Condorcet's thwarting and deterence of burial, it seems to me, doesn't > work nearly as well when there are more > than 3 candidates. That means that SFC doesn't mean as much. SFC was > central to my advocacy of Condorcet. > > So, for all of those reasons, I don't consider Condorcet, in any of its > versions, to be a good proposal for single-winner reform. > > In addition to Approval's FBC compliance, and the fact that CD compliance > can easily be added via the conditional > options, Approval is the answer to the question "There are so many voting > system proposals--Why should we choose > yours?". > > Approval's answer is: > > "Because Approval is the minimal, obvious, natural, easily-implemented, > improvement-change from Plurality. Plurality done right. Approval > transparently eliminates Plurality's worst problem, without adding one." > > And then, with the conditionality-options added, perhaps in a later > proposal, the method will have un-equalled > freedom from strategy problems, unmatched mild strategy. > > Could it be that the simplest and most obvious and natural is the also > best, in terms of getting rid of strategy problems? > > Yes. > > Mike Ossipoff > > > > > ---- > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info > >
---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
