2012/2/3 David L Wetzell <[email protected]> > [sarcasm]Thanks for the constructive criticism of the model building > process. > > I'm so sorry I haven't had as many pseudo-experimental models to buttress > my args on this list. They so commonly shed so much light on the matter, > it's no wonder you all agree on so much...[/sarcasm] >
We actually do agree on a lot. We talk about the stuff we don't agree on. > > Once again, you're the one w.o. any institutional backing. > OK, I'll go back to writing the voting server for Ubuntu then. Seriously, you can do better than sarcasm. I think "simplify, simplify, simplify" is in fact very constructive feedback on model-building. It's exactly what I want to hear when I'm doing it. > I'm the guy defending a modified version of the status quo single-winner > electoral alternative. The burden of proof is on you more so than me, > simply because the amount of time/energy spent educating folks about IRV is > o.w. a sunk cost that will likely have to be repeated if we theoretically > were to start over again. > Yes. What percent of US voters understand IRV? (Even if I substituted "US" with "Cambridge" or "SF", I doubt you'd reach even half.) The sunk cost is trivial relative to the size of the task. > > dlw > > On Fri, Feb 3, 2012 at 3:06 PM, Jameson Quinn <[email protected]>wrote: > >> Please, stop talking, and start calculating. If you're not ready to >> calculate, then at least stop arguing with us, and start arguing with the >> fuzzy beast, until you are. >> >> Jameson >> >> 2012/2/3 David L Wetzell <[email protected]> >> >>> dlw: When you try out a new piece of technology, you can't expect to >>>>> get it right right away. A democracy is a function of both the rules and >>>>> people's habits. If GOPers had seen that their party couldn't win then >>>>> some of them wd've voted Dem first and the CW wd have won.... >>>>> >>>> >>>> David! That's the point! That's the problem! IRV promised that you >>>> could vote for your favorite candidate and that would not help elect your >>>> least favorite. >>> >>> >>> dlw: They promised it to those who had to vote strategically way too >>> often with FPTP. They did not promise it was always true. >>> >>> >>>> it explicitly failed to do that on the second try. In this town that, >>>> at least 3 years ago, had 3 major parties (so the spoiler wasn't some kinda >>>> Ron Paul or Ralph Nader gadfly who had no hope of election but could still >>>> rob victory from the majority candidate). In the context where the 3 (or >>>> more) candidates are *all* plausible, Condorcet would have elected a >>>> candidate where, by definition, no other candidate was preferred over this >>>> CW and, at least in the Burlington 2009 example, would not have suffered >>>> spoiler, punishment for sincere voting, non-monotonicity, and >>>> non-summability/transparency. >>>> >>> >>> dlw: non-monotonicity is not at fault here, unless you expect a large >>> no. of GOP supporters to have a huge change of heart to support the Prog >>> party first....Neither was there a problem with summability/transparency... >>> >>> And how do you know there wouldn't be other foibles that emerge as folks >>> got adjusted to a Condorcet method? >>> >>> Perhaps the number of candidates would proliferate so much that it'd be >>> a vote-counting nightmare... >>> >>> At the end of the day, 3-way competitive elections for single-seat >>> positions are hard to sustain. IRV wd have made the parties around the >>> true center be the major parties. Now, it seems that won't be the case... >>> >>>> >>>> rbj: It *failed*, David. (but it still beats Plurality and, >>>> unfortunately the voters of Burlington, who adopted IRV by 65% in 2005, >>>> tossed the baby out with the bathwater in 2010 and *really* did in 2011 >>>> when they rejected the 50% threshold.) >>> >>> >>> dlw: Depends on your loss-function and whether you take a single-period >>> or multi-period assessment of the outcomes. >>> I refuse to accept a pass-fail assessment of IRV wrt Burlington. It's >>> not appropriate. It's playing into the hands of the opponents of electoral >>> reform by repeating their frames. >>> >>> >>>> rbj: now, elections are something that we (any particular group of >>>> people) do not do every day. it's not like you got your iPhone or iPad and >>>> it worked the day you bought it, and had trouble the second day, but you >>>> are willing to see how well it works the next day. it's more like a >>>> high-rise building technique or bridge-building technique (e.g. Tacoma >>>> Narrows Bridge). if you use some new technique and it fails the first time >>>> you use it, you better believe there will be hesitation and controversy the >>>> next time its use is proposed. and very similar if it happens the second >>>> use. >>>> >>> >>> It depends on the severity of the loss. You are exaggerating the >>> practical bads of the election of a non-CW somewhat left of the CW. >>> Micronumerosity says we got to not draw strong conclusions from very >>> limited use of something new. It tells us we need to turn away from our >>> fallen human natures driven by our fears. >>> >>>> >>>> rbj: on the other hand, if the technique was used 50 times before it >>>> failed, you would more likely look at the failure as a fluke or outlier. >>>> elections happen once or twice a year (if you're politically active, if >>>> you're not it's more like once in four years) and their consequences are >>>> significant, in some cases worse than a building collapse. >>>> >>> >>> dlw: Once again, assess the "damage" and take the longer view of how >>> this will play into the next election. If IRV had been continued the Prog >>> candidate wd have moved to the right some to woo Democrats so the outcome >>> wd have been preferred by most people. >>> >>> "a failure that occurs so soon after adoption might very well be an >>> indication of something systemic, not just an outlier." >>> >>> dlw: It ain't necessarily so... and you got to consider the relative >>> import of type one vs type two errors. A sample of type 2 is not going to >>> be powerful and when you try to make it powerful, you increase the >>> likelihood of a type one error, ending the use of a good election rule >>> before it had a chance to prove itself among a populace that understands it >>> better. >>> >>>> >>>>> dlw:To prevent all tactical voting is not the greatest good. >>>>> >>>> >>>> The *primary* reason for adopting ranked-choice voting, the greatest >>>> good promised, is to remove the *burden* of tactical voting from voters so >>>> that they do not experience voter's regret the day after the election >>>> (which, here in Burlington, soured many voters that do not return to the >>>> polls, thus reducing participation in democracy). i don't suggest that we >>>> can prevent all tactical voting, but the common burden of tactical voting, >>>> the tactic called "compromising", is avoidable and *should* be avoided >>>> where at all possible. >>>> >>> >>> Think about it. Really? Preventing anyone from being pressured to >>> tactical voting is the greatest good? Shouldn't it be to make the parties >>> responsive to the general views of the population? To reduce the distance >>> between the de facto and true political center? >>> >>> I don't have a problem if a major party chooses to get ideologically >>> stuck so some of its supporters have to abandon it because of its >>> non-electability. >>> >>> In our context where $peech is so strong the "tactical voters" are more >>> likely to be the ones who've been gaming the system for their own bottom >>> line for quite some time. It isn't the same thing for them to be pressured >>> to vote insincerely as it is when third party dissenters from "dumb and >>> dumber" get pressured to vote that way. The former bonds the de facto and >>> true center. The latter severs the two. >>> >>> >>> dlw >>> >>>> >>>> >>> ---- >>> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list >>> info >>> >>> >> >
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