> > > From: Jameson Quinn <[email protected]> > To: EM <[email protected]> > Cc: > Date: Fri, 3 Feb 2012 16:25:26 -0600 > Subject: Re: [EM] not fair. > > > 2012/2/3 David L Wetzell <[email protected]> > >> [sarcasm]Thanks for the constructive criticism of the model building >> process. >> >> I'm so sorry I haven't had as many pseudo-experimental models to buttress >> my args on this list. They so commonly shed so much light on the matter, >> it's no wonder you all agree on so much...[/sarcasm] >> > > We actually do agree on a lot. We talk about the stuff we don't agree on. >
dlw: 4 electoral rules in your consensus statement is not a lot of agreement. You're going back and forth on Approval vs Condorcet. I believe I can get some amens from some of our less techie readers here that it's rather bewildering for them. > > >> >> Once again, you're the one w.o. any institutional backing. >> > > OK, I'll go back to writing the voting server for Ubuntu then. > If political voting rules were only like such... > > Seriously, you can do better than sarcasm. I think "simplify, simplify, > simplify" is in fact very constructive feedback on model-building. It's > exactly what I want to hear when I'm doing it. > dlw: I said there were parts that I could leave out. I'd rather start w. the whole and then drop feature by feature to see what's driving the results. It's something I learned in a Computer Science course I took as an undergrad. > > >> I'm the guy defending a modified version of the status quo single-winner >> electoral alternative. The burden of proof is on you more so than me, >> simply because the amount of time/energy spent educating folks about IRV is >> o.w. a sunk cost that will likely have to be repeated if we theoretically >> were to start over again. >> > > Yes. What percent of US voters understand IRV? (Even if I substituted "US" > with "Cambridge" or "SF", I doubt you'd reach even half.) The sunk cost is > trivial relative to the size of the task. > Among progressive/centrist activists who are the movers and shakers of the US's democracy, there's a lot higher understanding of IRV. dlw > > >> >> dlw >> >> On Fri, Feb 3, 2012 at 3:06 PM, Jameson Quinn <[email protected]>wrote: >> >>> Please, stop talking, and start calculating. If you're not ready to >>> calculate, then at least stop arguing with us, and start arguing with the >>> fuzzy beast, until you are. >>> >>> Jameson >>> >>> 2012/2/3 David L Wetzell <[email protected]> >>> >>>> dlw: When you try out a new piece of technology, you can't expect to >>>>>> get it right right away. A democracy is a function of both the rules and >>>>>> people's habits. If GOPers had seen that their party couldn't win then >>>>>> some of them wd've voted Dem first and the CW wd have won.... >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> David! That's the point! That's the problem! IRV promised that you >>>>> could vote for your favorite candidate and that would not help elect your >>>>> least favorite. >>>> >>>> >>>> dlw: They promised it to those who had to vote strategically way too >>>> often with FPTP. They did not promise it was always true. >>>> >>>> >>>>> it explicitly failed to do that on the second try. In this town that, >>>>> at least 3 years ago, had 3 major parties (so the spoiler wasn't some >>>>> kinda >>>>> Ron Paul or Ralph Nader gadfly who had no hope of election but could still >>>>> rob victory from the majority candidate). In the context where the 3 (or >>>>> more) candidates are *all* plausible, Condorcet would have elected a >>>>> candidate where, by definition, no other candidate was preferred over this >>>>> CW and, at least in the Burlington 2009 example, would not have suffered >>>>> spoiler, punishment for sincere voting, non-monotonicity, and >>>>> non-summability/transparency. >>>>> >>>> >>>> dlw: non-monotonicity is not at fault here, unless you expect a large >>>> no. of GOP supporters to have a huge change of heart to support the Prog >>>> party first....Neither was there a problem with summability/transparency... >>>> >>>> And how do you know there wouldn't be other foibles that emerge as >>>> folks got adjusted to a Condorcet method? >>>> >>>> Perhaps the number of candidates would proliferate so much that it'd be >>>> a vote-counting nightmare... >>>> >>>> At the end of the day, 3-way competitive elections for single-seat >>>> positions are hard to sustain. IRV wd have made the parties around the >>>> true center be the major parties. Now, it seems that won't be the case... >>>> >>>>> >>>>> rbj: It *failed*, David. (but it still beats Plurality and, >>>>> unfortunately the voters of Burlington, who adopted IRV by 65% in 2005, >>>>> tossed the baby out with the bathwater in 2010 and *really* did in 2011 >>>>> when they rejected the 50% threshold.) >>>> >>>> >>>> dlw: Depends on your loss-function and whether you take a single-period >>>> or multi-period assessment of the outcomes. >>>> I refuse to accept a pass-fail assessment of IRV wrt Burlington. It's >>>> not appropriate. It's playing into the hands of the opponents of electoral >>>> reform by repeating their frames. >>>> >>>> >>>>> rbj: now, elections are something that we (any particular group of >>>>> people) do not do every day. it's not like you got your iPhone or iPad >>>>> and >>>>> it worked the day you bought it, and had trouble the second day, but you >>>>> are willing to see how well it works the next day. it's more like a >>>>> high-rise building technique or bridge-building technique (e.g. Tacoma >>>>> Narrows Bridge). if you use some new technique and it fails the first >>>>> time >>>>> you use it, you better believe there will be hesitation and controversy >>>>> the >>>>> next time its use is proposed. and very similar if it happens the second >>>>> use. >>>>> >>>> >>>> It depends on the severity of the loss. You are exaggerating the >>>> practical bads of the election of a non-CW somewhat left of the CW. >>>> Micronumerosity says we got to not draw strong conclusions from very >>>> limited use of something new. It tells us we need to turn away from our >>>> fallen human natures driven by our fears. >>>> >>>>> >>>>> rbj: on the other hand, if the technique was used 50 times before it >>>>> failed, you would more likely look at the failure as a fluke or outlier. >>>>> elections happen once or twice a year (if you're politically active, if >>>>> you're not it's more like once in four years) and their consequences are >>>>> significant, in some cases worse than a building collapse. >>>>> >>>> >>>> dlw: Once again, assess the "damage" and take the longer view of how >>>> this will play into the next election. If IRV had been continued the Prog >>>> candidate wd have moved to the right some to woo Democrats so the outcome >>>> wd have been preferred by most people. >>>> >>>> "a failure that occurs so soon after adoption might very well be an >>>> indication of something systemic, not just an outlier." >>>> >>>> dlw: It ain't necessarily so... and you got to consider the relative >>>> import of type one vs type two errors. A sample of type 2 is not going to >>>> be powerful and when you try to make it powerful, you increase the >>>> likelihood of a type one error, ending the use of a good election rule >>>> before it had a chance to prove itself among a populace that understands it >>>> better. >>>> >>>>> >>>>>> dlw:To prevent all tactical voting is not the greatest good. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> The *primary* reason for adopting ranked-choice voting, the greatest >>>>> good promised, is to remove the *burden* of tactical voting from voters so >>>>> that they do not experience voter's regret the day after the election >>>>> (which, here in Burlington, soured many voters that do not return to the >>>>> polls, thus reducing participation in democracy). i don't suggest that we >>>>> can prevent all tactical voting, but the common burden of tactical voting, >>>>> the tactic called "compromising", is avoidable and *should* be avoided >>>>> where at all possible. >>>>> >>>> >>>> Think about it. Really? Preventing anyone from being pressured to >>>> tactical voting is the greatest good? Shouldn't it be to make the parties >>>> responsive to the general views of the population? To reduce the distance >>>> between the de facto and true political center? >>>> >>>> I don't have a problem if a major party chooses to get ideologically >>>> stuck so some of its supporters have to abandon it because of its >>>> non-electability. >>>> >>>> In our context where $peech is so strong the "tactical voters" are more >>>> likely to be the ones who've been gaming the system for their own bottom >>>> line for quite some time. It isn't the same thing for them to be pressured >>>> to vote insincerely as it is when third party dissenters from "dumb and >>>> dumber" get pressured to vote that way. The former bonds the de facto and >>>> true center. The latter severs the two. >>>> >>>> >>>> dlw >>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> ---- >>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list >>>> info >>>> >>>> >>> >> > > _______________________________________________ > Election-Methods mailing list > [email protected] > http://lists.electorama.com/listinfo.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com > >
---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
