Jameson:
You wrote:
Actually,
with SODA, it does help, because you can know ex ante (by looking at
the predeclared preferences) when you are safe by FBC. That is, if you
prefer A>B, and B prefers A, or A prefers B, or A and B both prefer a
certain viable C, then you are safe. Only if B prefers the most-viable
third candidate C, but A is indifferent between B and C, then you might
consider a favorite-betraying vote for B. And even then, it's only
appropriate if A very nearly, but not quite, is able to win... not
exactly the situation where favorite betrayal is the first thing on your
mind.
This is a specific enough circumstance that
favorite-betraying strategy would never "take off" and become a serious
factor in SODA.
With
SODA, you can give that as a solid ex-ante guarantee to most voters,
just not quite all of them. This is unlike the situation in most voting
systems, where you can make no solid guarantees before the vote unless
you can make them to all voters.
[endquote]
Ok yes, as you say, that's a very different situation from the ordinary
FBC-failure, because, for most people there is known to be no favorite-burial
need. The favorite-burial problem really
exists when there's uncertainty for everyone, or for a large percentage of the
voters, which isn't the case with SODA.
Mike Ossipoff
----
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
