2012/3/1 MIKE OSSIPOFF <[email protected]> > Jameson: > > You wrote: > > Actually, with SODA, it does help, because you can know ex ante (by > looking at the predeclared preferences) when you are safe by FBC. That is, > if you prefer A>B, and B prefers A, or A prefers B, or A and B both prefer > a certain viable C, then you are safe. Only if B prefers the most-viable > third candidate C, but A is indifferent between B and C, then you might > consider a favorite-betraying vote for B. And even then, it's only > appropriate if A very nearly, but not quite, is able to win... not exactly > the situation where favorite betrayal is the first thing on your mind. > > This is a specific enough circumstance that favorite-betraying strategy > would never "take off" and become a serious factor in SODA. > > With SODA, you can give that as a solid ex-ante guarantee to most voters, > just not quite all of them. This is unlike the situation in most voting > systems, where you can make no solid guarantees before the vote unless you > can make them to all voters. > > [endquote] > > Ok yes, as you say, that's a very different situation from the ordinary > FBC-failure, because, for most people there is known to be no > favorite-burial need. The favorite-burial problem really > exists when there's uncertainty for everyone, or for a large percentage of > the voters, which isn't the case with SODA. > > Thank you.
By the way, I left out one further circumstance in which you are FBC-safe. Using the letters above, you are also safe if C declared a preference for B. If C prefers A or is indifferent between A and B, then you might have to worry (if all the other circumstances listed above also pertain.) Jameson Jameson
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