2012/3/23 MIKE OSSIPOFF <[email protected]> > > Dave: > > You wrote: > > On Mar 22, 2012, at 4:09 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: > > > On 03/22/2012 07:57 PM, MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote: > >> There are plenty of voters who report having to "hold their nose" and > > >> vote only for someone they don't like. They'd all like to be able to > >> vote for better candidates to, including their favorites. Even if one > >> only counts the Democrat voters who say that they're strategically > > >> forced > >> to vote only for someone they don't really like, amounts to a lot of > >> people who'd see the improvement brought by Approval. > > If there is no one acceptable to vote for, the voters have not done > > their job: > . Could happen occasionally such as failures in doing > nominations. Write-ins can help recover for this. > > [endquote] > > There could be elections in which there's no one acceptable to vote for, but, > as you > > said, even then, there should be write-ins. > > But, even with the difficulty of getting non-big-2 parties on the ballot, and > especially > after the way Approval will open things up, there will usually be someone > reasonably > > acceptable on the ballot. Even now, ballots often have a wide variety of > candidates > and parties. > > You continued: > > "strategically forced" should not be doable for how a particular voter > voted > > [endquote] > > It's doable because many voters are so resigned and cowed that it doesn't > take much to force them to do giveaway compromise strategy, without any > reliable information to justify that strategy. I refer to the progressive > people > > who think they strategically need to vote for the Democrat. > > You continued: > > (but no one voted for the supposedly forced choice > > [endquote] > > Regrettably, millions vote for that "choice", because it's billed as one of > "the two choices". > > You continued: > > - why force > such a hated choice? > > [endquote] > > To keep voters from voting for someone whom they genuinely prefer. What the > public, > including the voters, would like isn't the same as what is most profitable to > those who > > own the media that tell us about "the two choices". Everyone believes that > only they > have the preferences that they have, because that's how it looks in the media. > > Notice that all politicians routinely promise change. That's because they know > > that the public wants change. So the politicians are adamant about change. > They're > mad as hell and they want to do something about it, and give us change. > Amazingly, that > pretense continues to reliably work, every time. > > > You continued: > > OMOV may inspire some - many of us have to argue against it having > value because we back, as better, methods this thought argues about - > such as Condorcet, Score, and even IRV. > > [endquote] > > OMOV is easily answered by pointing out that Approval let's everyone rate each > candidate as approved or unapproved. > > You continued: > > Part of the chicken dilemma difficulty is that it depends on what some > > voters will do without any compulsion, and what others will do after > making promises to cooperate > > [endquote] > > The chicken dilemma is very difficult to get rid of. I don't know of anyone > proposing a FBC-complying method that really gets rid of that problem. > > The methods that I call "defection-resistant" do much to alleviate that > problem, > but don't eliminate it. They just push it to a secondary level, where > defection strategy is more > complicated and counterintuitive, and therefore less likely to be used. > > A party whose members might defect by not support your party in Approval > isn't likely > to engage in the Machiavellianly bizarre strategy of conditionally approving > Democrats, > Republicans, Libertarians and Nazis in order to gain some mutual conditional > approvals. Not > > if ethical reputation counts for anything. > > I've said that methods that don't get rid of that problem don't significantly > improve on ordinary Approval. All that can be said for the > defection-resistant methods > > is that they might improve a little on Approval, in a way. > > In other words, the improvement is questionable at best. And, for most > methods trying > to improve on Approval, the improvement is outright illusory. > > > I'd say that Approval can't be improved on, other than questionably or > doubtfully. > > I'd counter that SODA is a clear improvement for those who want to delegate, and no worse for those who don't.
Jameson > > > Mike Ossipoff > > > ---- > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info > >
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