On Mar 23, 2012, at 7:28 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
2012/3/23 MIKE OSSIPOFF <nkk...@hotmail.com>
Dave:
You wrote:
On Mar 22, 2012, at 4:09 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
> On 03/22/2012 07:57 PM, MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
>> There are plenty of voters who report having to "hold their nose"
and
>> vote only for someone they don't like. They'd all like to be able
to
>> vote for better candidates to, including their favorites. Even if
one
>> only counts the Democrat voters who say that they're strategically
>> forced
>> to vote only for someone they don't really like, amounts to a lot
of
>> people who'd see the improvement brought by Approval.
If there is no one acceptable to vote for, the voters have not done
their job:
. Could happen occasionally such as failures in doing
nominations. Write-ins can help recover for this.
[endquote]
There could be elections in which there's no one acceptable to vote
for, but, as you
said, even then, there should be write-ins.
But, even with the difficulty of getting non-big-2 parties on the
ballot, and especially
after the way Approval will open things up, there will usually be
someone reasonably
acceptable on the ballot. Even now, ballots often have a wide
variety of candidates
and parties.
My point is that it is voter responsibility to see to it that there
are acceptable candidates on the ballot:
. The laws should provide for practical quality nominations - if
not, the voters should see to fixing.
. Voters should see to good nominations - another voter
responsibility.
. Even with quality above there can be failures - occasional
failures can be expected - we just need to worry when they are too
common.
You continued:
"strategically forced" should not be doable for how a particular voter
voted
[endquote]
It's doable because many voters are so resigned and cowed that it
doesn't
take much to force them to do giveaway compromise strategy, without
any
reliable information to justify that strategy. I refer to the
progressive people
who think they strategically need to vote for the Democrat.
You continued:
(but no one voted for the supposedly forced choice
[endquote]
Regrettably, millions vote for that "choice", because it's billed as
one of "the two choices".
You continued:
- why force
such a hated choice?
[endquote]
To keep voters from voting for someone whom they genuinely prefer.
What the public,
including the voters, would like isn't the same as what is most
profitable to those who
own the media that tell us about "the two choices". Everyone
believes that only they
have the preferences that they have, because that's how it looks in
the media.
Notice that all politicians routinely promise change. That's because
they know
that the public wants change. So the politicians are adamant about
change. They're
mad as hell and they want to do something about it, and give us
change. Amazingly, that
pretense continues to reliably work, every time.
My point was that, except for absentee ballots, secrecy should be
known to be perfect and thus the enforcers have no power:
. If there are no votes as demanded, that proves no one obeyed -
but this should be very unlikely for normal expected voting.
. There can be ways to violate secrecy on absentee processing,
though doing this should be avoided.
You continued:
OMOV may inspire some - many of us have to argue against it having
value because we back, as better, methods this thought argues about -
such as Condorcet, Score, and even IRV.
[endquote]
OMOV is easily answered by pointing out that Approval let's everyone
rate each
candidate as approved or unapproved.
But the complaint is that that letting makes Approval an invalid
system. Response to that is that letting each voter rate or rank more
than one leaves them equal power.
. I was noting that many of the better methods permit violating
OMOV.
You continued:
Part of the chicken dilemma difficulty is that it depends on what some
voters will do without any compulsion, and what others will do after
making promises to cooperate
[endquote]
The chicken dilemma is very difficult to get rid of. I don't know of
anyone
proposing a FBC-complying method that really gets rid of that problem.
On the other hand, it is very difficult to cause trouble with. The
plotter:
. Needs to know expectable normal vote counts for this collection
of voters and this topic.
. Know the change wanted and get it voted.
. Somehow avoid others, perhaps due to hearing of these proposed
changes, of making conflicting changes.
Dave Ketchum
The methods that I call "defection-resistant" do much to alleviate
that problem,
but don't eliminate it. They just push it to a secondary level,
where defection strategy is more
complicated and counterintuitive, and therefore less likely to be
used.
A party whose members might defect by not support your party in
Approval isn't likely
to engage in the Machiavellianly bizarre strategy of conditionally
approving Democrats,
Republicans, Libertarians and Nazis in order to gain some mutual
conditional approvals. Not
if ethical reputation counts for anything.
I've said that methods that don't get rid of that problem don't
significantly
improve on ordinary Approval. All that can be said for the defection-
resistant methods
is that they might improve a little on Approval, in a way.
In other words, the improvement is questionable at best. And, for
most methods trying
to improve on Approval, the improvement is outright illusory.
I'd say that Approval can't be improved on, other than questionably
or doubtfully.
I'd counter that SODA is a clear improvement for those who want to
delegate, and no worse for those who don't.
Jameson
Mike Ossipoff
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