On 04/02/2012 03:49 PM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 08:57 PM 4/1/2012, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
Approval applies a burden of tactical voting to the voter right from
the start.
In other words, a burden of responsibility for the effect of our actions
on the world. Those who would protect voters from taking responsibility
for their actions are those who really don't care about democracy, which
requires this responsibility. Note that Approval is simply Plurality
with an option. With an option comes an increase in power, with an
increase in power comes an increase in responsibility.
Keep in mind that voting in itself is a way of easing a burden. Ideally,
we'd all get in one big town-hall meeting and keep discussing until
there's a majority - or supermajority, if you like consensus. However,
that's impractical. So instead, when there are too many people, we vote.
Approval requires data so that the voters can make the decision about
where to put his Approval threshold. In that respect, it requires more
coordination than the (good) ranked voting systems. If you're willing to
accept that need for coordination so that you can get better results
with a simpler system, then that's alright, but others might disagree.
I don't think it's inherently contradictory for Robert to want to just
have to rank without having to take into account "his responses to their
responses to his responses" through rounds of polling. He simply wants
to be closer to the one-off voting end of the axis, farther from
town-hall interaction end.
Much of the difficulty here comes from adopting an anti-democratic
principle, election without a true majority approval. Basic democratic
process requires making no decision without majority approval. In the
name of "efficiency" or "cost savings" -- same thing -- we give up
democracy. That's an old story, eh?
Within standard process, where elections fail (and presumably are
repeated, then), if there is no majority approval for an outcome,
Approval can be seen as a simple and fair way to make the process more
efficient. Don't know whether or not to Approve So-So? Don't. But that
might cause the election to fail! We'll need to keep voting or the
Office of Dogcatcher will go vacant! Sure. Don't want that cost, approve
So-so. There is still no such thing as a free lunch.
In a practical modification of Plurality, as is discussed here, not
approving So-So wouldn't trigger an additional round to home in on
consensus. Instead, Worse might win with less than majority approval.
The convergence wouldn't be built into the system, but rather would have
to be done by the means of polling, and I think that's quite fragile.
perhaps someone will want to bury a candidate they sorta like but who
is not their favorite, to help their favorite win. if they don't
Approve, then how much Bayesian regret will result when they find out
their favorite was not in the running at all and their 2nd choice lost
narrowly to someone they hated? if they do Approve, how much regret
will result when their favorite lost narrowly to their 2nd choice?
Oh, my head hurts! You mean I actually have to think and weigh options?
They didn't warn me about this when I registered to vote!
"Oh, my head hurts! You mean I actually have to get into the meeting and
try to convince a majority of the thousands already there? They didn't
warn me about this when I registered to vote!"
Granted, that's a bit unfair, but I'm merely trying to show that one can
reasonably prefer a method that requires less external convergence to
one that requires more. Perhaps the results will be worse (perhaps not).
But the burden will be lighter, too.
If you don't trust your Favorite to make further decisions, why in the
world would you want to elect him or her to the job?
That's a good statement for parliamentarism, as well. Though I prefer
parliamentarism, let's consider why someone might prefer direct
elections to Asset-like systems. I think it involves quantization error.
Simply put, a majority of a majority is not the same thing as a
majority. Similarly, the favorite of your favorite may not be the same
as your favorite. So it's not that cut-and-dried.
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