Juho: You said:
I'm a "condorcetist" in the sense that I think that Condorcet methods are a pretty good local optimum for some election types. [endquote] Condorcet-Criterion methods would be fine for EM. I doubt very much that EM members would have any favorite-burial need, with Condorcet, or Condorcet-Criterion methods. However, the co-operation/defection problem can appear just as easily here on EM as anywhere. Therefore, for EM voting, Smith-Top would be fine, in this non-favorite-burying electorate that includes a fair number of people who insist on Condorcet's Criterion (CC). Ideally, I'd still prefer ITC, but Smith-Top would be fine. In fact, for that EM electorate, with so few voters, there could even be an argument for Schwartz-Top. Myself, if EM were voting on political candidates, or on voting systems, I'd consider it a u/a election. Therefore, on the Voter's Choice 2 ballot, I'd designate "Direct", meaning that my ballot would award points directly ,according to my marks on my Approval ballot. ...And, for EM, I'd prefer Voter's Choice 2 to the single-designation Voter's Choice. Maybe Voter's Choice (only allowing one method designation) could have appeal for when the public distrust all alternative methods. Then, single-designation Voter's Choice might be an easier proposal. But even single-designation Voter's Choice should allow the "Direct" designation. If the person wants to use it, it would mean giving one point to one candidate, instead of being counted toward the points that a method could bestow on its winner. If we were using single-designation Voter's Choice in a poll on voting systems, I'd designate "Direct", and give my point to Approval, as the only acceptable in a u/a election. But if that single-designation Voter's Choice poll were about political candidates, and I wanted to help several, then I'd probably designate Approval, ICT, Smith-Top or Schwartz-Top--whichever seemed more popular. Not that I'd necessarily want to help several. So, yes, Condorcet Criterion methods could have use in some electorates, such as EM. Maybe some organizations too. I'd said: > You want to quibble forever about which rank-count is the best. You replied: No interest to quibble. [endquote] Thank you. But of course that's what EM is all about. A debate-club, and not a productive place for advocacy of actual practical reform. You continued: Unfortunately this problem exists. But it is not fatal. It could be seen also as a large set of available options. [endquote] Make that "subset". And yes, as long as you keep the total set large, then voting system reform advocates are their own worst opponents. > > You object that Approval doesn't let you help your 1st and 2nd choices > against your last choice, while still helping your 1st choice against your 2nd choice. Approval ballots contain less information than ranked or full rated ballots. [endquote] I've already said that I have no quibble with the non-practical mathematical study of ways of counting sincere rankings. > > But the _big_ benefit starts when everyone can support their 1st and 2nd choices at all. Benefits depend on where you start from. [endquote] And guess where we're starting from here?... :-) We're starting with Plurality. > > Do you have any idea how things would be if everyone could actually > support their favorites, and without having to try to guess on which one the other similar voters would be combining their support? I guess we are speaking about the U.S. elections here. Do you recommend compromise seeking single-winner election methods like Approval or Condorcet to be used in electing representative bodies from single-winner districts? [endquote] Juho, I recommend that you look up, somewhere, what sort of elections we do here. I'll explain it. Other than some municipal elections all of our elections are single-winner elections. We elect our state legislatures in single-winner elections (though there have been just a few exceptions). We elect the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives in single-winner elections. I'm not suggesting a complete change of the political system, such as proportional representation or parliamentary government. Parliamentary govt is fine, but it's too big A change to ask for here, at least now. PR is likewise much too difficult to ask for here, a big change. I'm asking only for the minimal change: For our single-winner elections, for which we already use Plurality, I merely suggest that we repeal Plurality's ridiculous forced falsification requirement. And yes, our Presidential elections are effectively by Plurality, at least in the states, for the most part. Many would prefer one nationally-counted presidential election. So would I, but I'd settle for Approval in the states, first. But, first of all, Approval for Congress (HR and sentate), and state legislatures. You said: I note that that would lead to an interesting political system that has probably not been tested anywhere in the world yet. [endquote] Single winner elections have actually been tested! And widely used, Juho! I kid you not! (In the U.S., England and Canada, for instance. I recommend that you visit the library and check for yourself.) What would be somewhat new would be single-winner elections without Plurality's forced falsification requirement. And yes, the lack of testing and prior experience would be a problem for most reform proposals. But not for Approval, because, as I said, that minimal change from Plurality is so simple that it would be obvious that it would be an improvement, and nothing other than an improvement. > Do you understand the difference between "liked" and "unliked"? And > what would happen if everyone could support whom and what they actually like best? Do you recommend "sincere Approval" where people sincerely approve those candidates that they "like", or "strategic Approval" where people are supposed to find the best strategy for them and vote that way? [endquote] You didn't read my article. I recommend Approval. How the person votes is up to hir. But, if you'd read the article, you'd know that my first recommendation is to just approve whom you like, trust and consider deserving of your support. But if you want to strategize, my first suggestion is that you can approve the candidate for whom you'd vote in Plurality, and also everyone who is better. Then I discussed other _optional_ strategy suggestions that can be made for Approval, due to its simplicity. Short answer: I recommend voting for whom you like, trust and consider deserving of your support. Strategize if you want to, that's ok too. You said: (The best strategy often includes approving the "lesser-evil" too.) [endquote] ...and for everyone who is better. If you feel that you need such strategy. Again, see my article, or what I wrote directly above. You said: My guess is that in public elections strategic approach to Approval would dominate. [endquote] Fine. If people approve whom they'd vote for in Plurality, and also everyone whom they like more, that would be just fine. They'd be approving, supporting their genuine favorites. > > Do you want improvement or not? Or would you rather debate forever? If this is a reference to the minor change in the electoral system to change Plurality to Approval [endquote] ...minor in procedural change. Immense in results-difference. You said: , then I agree that Approval has this benefit of being an easy change. I'm not sure that I'd recommend Approval in the U.S. for presidential elections or various representative bodies. [endquote] Are you also not sure how you justify recommending against it? If you're merely saying that you make no recommendation regarding voting systems here, then that's fine. If you're saying that Approval is less qualified for recommendation, than that claim would call for justification. You said: That leaves open the posibility of moving later forwad for example to Condorcet methods. [endquote] Fine. Plan for that later, because you realize that, right now, Approval's _minimal_ change is what can be justified, and what people can be assured won't worsen the Results. > > And, as for helping 1st choice over 2nd choice, while helping both over last choice, free of strategy need: > > You're in deinal about Gibbard-Satterthwaite. > > You're in denial about Condorcet's blatant and full-magnitude co-operation/defection problem. I don't see any denial of Gibbard-Satterthwaite or other problems. My understanding is that many people like Condorcet methods because they think that their co-operation/defection problems are relatively small (although they exist at least in theory). [endquote] Nonsense. Can you justify that claim? I've showed a whole range of numerical examples, from the 27,24,49 example to the 33,32,34 example. I've told how the problem would come about, in Condorcet, just as well as in Approval. Condorcet is not strategy-free, or anything close to it. To me the promise of Condorcet methods is in that in large real life electons their vulnerabilities would be small and difficult to use, and as a result people could vote sincerely [endquote] See above. (without strategic concerns and without strategic intent). Dream on. That's the mythical promise of rank balloting. I believe that ICT might actually come close to delivering on that promise. Condorcet does not. I've abundantly told why. If you specifically disagree with something I've said about that, then tell which statement you disagree with, and why, and be specific. > > And you're in denial about millions of voters' need to litterally maximally help the Democrat beat the Republican. I can see a potential problem of numerous voters voting D > all_others > R or R > all_others > D in the first Condorcet elections just to make sure that their worst competitors will not win. My hope is that they would soon learn that there is no need and no sense to do so. [endquote] You see, that hope isn't good enough, unless it has some evidentiary supporet. The promise of Condorcet is that sincere ranking is sufficient. [endquote] Wouldn't it be nice if all promises were kept. > > And that's not even counting the good chance of successful offensive burial strategy when there are more than 3 candidates. In real life such strategies are not very easy to implement. I have asked multiple times people to write down some guidelines for strategies in real life Condorcet elections but I have not seen any yet. [endquote] Then you haven't read my postings. Yes, Condorcet's strategy is far too complicated to be known. But people will know that the Democrat can only be maximally helped to beat the Republican by favorite-burial. And the co-operation/defection problem will soon or immediately make itself obvious. You said: What kind of public voting recommendations should Demorats or their support goups give to their own voters if the polls show that they are slightly ahead of the Republicans at the moment, or slightly behind, and there are also other parties in the election (maybe one right wing, one left wing, two centrist parties and one in some unspecified direction)? Should they say "let the best man win" or "let's use some strategy to take the victory although people don't like us"? Could a party lose support (the crucial 1%) if they adopt the latter message? I mean that sincerity may pay off also this way. [endquote] No, I don't consider offensive burial to be Condorcet's worst problem. Maybe its 3rd worst, after favorite-burial and co-operation/defection. (I know that in Australia people vote in ranked elections as told by the parties, and in a way that does not necessarily reflect the sincere opinion of the individual voters. But without going to the details of the Australian system and its problems, here I assume that voters will make independent decisions on how to vote, maybe based on some guidance from the parties, candidates and media, but not all voting in a fixed way as told by the party. Maybe that is a fair assumption in the U.S. political environment.) [endquote] Or maybe not. U.S. voters entirely trust and believe the corporate mass media. The media tell them who "the two choices" are, and the voters all believe it. That's why, in a beautiful and perfect Myerson-Weber equilibrium, two unliked parties will keep on winning forever, or for as long as we keep Plurality. Mike Ossipoff Juho > > Mike Ossipoff > > > > > ---- > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list > info ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
