Juho: You wrote:
Yes, I know. I was thinking that good single-winner methods have been designed to elect single winners. They are not designed to elect representative bodies from single-winner districts. [endquote] I don't know when or where Plurality was first proposed &/or used, but I can assure you that it's widely believed here that single-member districts, elected by a single-winner method, is the right way to elect Congress. We agree that PR hasn't any chance in the U.S. And you're right: Approval, or any other good single-winner method would tend to elect the same party to Congress in each single winner district. That's fine with me, because if it's a good single-winner method, then it would be a good choice. As for PR, not only is it entirely un-enactable in the U.S. (in spite of previous use of STV), but it also is obsolete. Don't get me wrong--I'm not criticizing PR. The countries where you and Kristofer live don't have the voting system problem that we have, because PR is used. PR can do a great job. But PR can fail when it has too few seats per district, or a threshold that excludes small parties. PR is fine, provided that there are sufficiently many seats per district, and there isn't an inclusion threshold. I suppose a very low threshold would be ok, but it would be better to have no threshold at all. I feel that any lack of perfection in the results of PR in Europe can be attributed to small districts &/or theresholds. I won't deny that the we could definitely benefit from borrowing some ideas from Europe. Good PR would be one such beneficial borrowing. But, as I said, PR is un-enactable here. I'd be entirely satisfied if a good single-winner method were used for electing Congress and state legislatures in single-member districts. But which would be the _best_? Neither, of course. Proxy Direct Democracy would be best. Proxy DD uses single-winner methods to make multi-alternative choices. I've defined Proxy DD some months ago, and we discussed it. Basically, all decisions now made by Congress are made by direct democracy. Implemented by home computers, library computers, home telephones, etc. I described how an anonymous voter ID number could be obtained and used. A voter can designate proxies, or a sequence of proxies, or indicate that he'll let his voting power follow his proxy's list of proxies. Your proxy could by anyone. Parent, spouse, child, employer, teacher, party leader, candidate, etc. Anyone. You continued: In theory use of a Condorcet method in the Senate and House of Representatives elections could lead to electing all representatives from a small centrist party (zero from Democrats, zero from Republicans). Probably that is not the intent. [endquote] Electing each representative from the same winning party is what happens now, regardless of what the single-winner method is. Of course that was the intent. And, regarding that "small centrist party": There's no reason why a voter-median party must be small. It could be small, or large. And let's be clear about "centrist". It can mean, "somewhere between the Democrat and the Republican". Or it can mean voter-median. Two very different things. You said: I see multi-winner methods as a separate set of methods where the requitements are quite different from the single-winner method requirements. Representative bodies have multiple members, so by default they should use multi-winner methods. Pluraity based two-party systems are a special case that uses Plurality (a s-w method) to achieve the two-party effect in a m-w election. But in general, a good s-w method is not necessarily a good m-w method, and a good m-w method is not necessarily good s-w method. [endquote] As I said, I'd have no objection to PR, provided that there are lots of seats per district, and no inclusion threshold. And as I also said, we could benefit greatly by borrowing ideas from Europe, and PR would be fine. But PR isn't _necessary_ if we use a good single-winner method. PR isn't the only way. I do understand that jumping e.g. to PR and multi-winner districts in the U.S. may not be possible in the short run. But I have not heard anyone naming use of single-winner methods in single-winner districts to elect multi-member representative bodies as their ideal target. [endquote] It would be a fine endpoint target. I'd be fine with a good single-winner method electing Congress in single-member districts. But, for me, the ideal target would be Proxy DD. As I said, it uses a single-winner method for all decisionmaking. You said: When I say that Condorcet methods are good methods I mean that they are good methods for typical single-winner elections (or to be more exact, for _compromise_seeking_ single-winner elections) (and I don't mean single-winner districts in multi-winner elections). [endquote] ...only if you disregard their favorite-burial incentive, and (for most of them) their C/D problem. Both Approval and Condorcet methods are compromise seeking single-winner methods in the sense that they tend to elect centrist compromise candiates with no requirement of proportionality. In that sense changing the method from Plurality to Approval may lead to major changes in the distribution of the seats in the long run (although the technical change is small). [endquote] Yes, the procedural change is small, and the results change would be _big_. ...And favorable. You continued: If one starts from a two-party set-up, in the first elections Approval may just allow some approvals to be given also to third parties, but it may still elect practically all representatives from the two old parties. [endquote] Maybe in the first election. But not for long. And maybe not even in the first election. Old party supporters might generally bullet vote. But in the long run things may change. Approval has the tendency to elect centrists, not from the two major parties of the two wings. [endquote] Whoa! Centrists, voter-median candidates, will _not_ be between the Republican and the Democrat! The Democrats and the Republicans are not the extremes. They're two nearly identical parties (actually better-named as one Republocrat party) with unpopular positions and corruption. Far from the voter median. The Republicans and Democrat parties would be all finished if Approval were enacted. You said: One may consider also that property to be an improvement. But from another viewpoint, maybe people don't want the system to change in that way. [endquote] Certainly those who benefit from the status quo don't want it to change. But American politicians always have to promise "change". It's the biggest buzzword. You can win an election without promising change. That's because the public want change. They don't know what kind of change they want, but they know something's not right. Of course there are conservative individuals who are more comfortable with nothing changing. But those who really don't want change are the excetion. You said: If one wants to allow also third party candidates to win, maybe the long term t arget could be proportional representation of all the parties. [endquote] If you're saying that only the Democrats and Republicans will win, if we don't have PR, I flatly disagree. The Democrats and Republicans will be finished when we replace Plurality with a good single-winner method. You said: The problems of Condorcet (when used as part of a a multi-winner method in single-winner districts) are quite similar. [endquote] Let's substitute "good single-winner method" for "Condorcet". It wouldn't have problems. In fact, though good PR would be fine too, I'd rather elect Congress and state legislatures in single-member districts via a good single-winner method such as Approval or ICT. That's because, why have all the rejected parties as part of the Congress? If that seems to contradict what I said about small districts and thresholds, remember that a good single-winner method is something entirely different from PR in small districts or with a high threshold. No, with PR, some unpopular parties would be able to stay in Congress. I wouldn't want that. Approval in single-member districts would be better. Or ITC. You said: It is possible that use of Approval would not lead to as clear tendency of electing centrist candidates as described above. [endquote] It has been shown that Approval will quickly home in on the voter-median, and then stay there. You said: But that does not mean that the method would behave in some other sensible way that would be easy to predict and easy to justify. [endquote] If you're referring to Approval, then in what way would it behave unsensibly, unjusitifably or unpredictably? Of course any election can be unpredictable. You said: Large parties might continue to bullet vote [endquote] Maybe some people at the top of top of the heap would bullet-vote for Republicans. But soon they'd see the need to approve both the Democrat and the Republican, when they saw that the Republocrats are no longer sure winners. The difference among Republocrats would be seen by their voters as the negligible differences that they are. But most everyone who votes Democrat now would approve someone better, whom s/he genuinely likes. Probably several candidates. Even if the Republocrats win the first Approval election, they soon won't be electable. You said: , and small parties might not grow strong enough to widely challenge the old strong ones. [endquote] The Republocrats win by Myerson-Weber equilibrium made possible only by Pluralilty. Without that, they're done. You said: Voters might stick to the stong ones since they are considered to be the strongest players in Washington anyway. [endquote] Strong with eachother's support, when practically none of them are re-elected? > If you're merely saying that you make no recommendation regarding > voting systems here, then that's fine. If you're saying that Approval > is less qualified for recommendation, than that claim would call for > justification. I think the U.S. citizens should decide, and I try to avoid taking position on what they should do. However, the reason why I see potential problems in the use of Approval or Condorcet in electing representative bodies is that they are not planned to be used that way. [endquote] They've been used in that way for so long here that they're now intended that way. And, as I said, I'd rather have winners of a good single-winner method in Congress than a mix of all parties. Why keep the unpopular ones? Given the choice between a _good_ single winner method and PR, I'd rather have the good single-winner method. Yes, PR is better than Plurality. Yes, PR does PR better when it lets small parties in. But why would we want unliked parties in Congress? PR would be the only way that the Republocrats could remain in office, if the alternative were a good single-winner method in single-member districts. Republocrats would become passionate proportionalists. For presidential elections Approval and Condorcet would be fine (or as good as they are as single-winner methods) except that the presidential elections of the U.S.A. are not pure single-winner elections in the sense that the whole presidential system is based on the assumption of having two major parties alternating in that posiion. [endquote] No doubt some do assume that. It's a bad assumption. It won't happen with a better single-winner method. You continued: I don't know what would happen if some compromise candidate from a minor centrist party would be elected as the next president [endquote] What do you mean by "minor"? Receiving the most "Approved" ratings? :-) Or maybe you're referring to any non-Republocrat party as "minor". We'll see who's "minor" when Plurality can no longer make its unpopular Myerson-Weber equilibrium, and when everyone can support whom and what they actually like. You continued: , and he.. [endquote] Don't be so sure that the president won't be a she. ...would have to build the presidential machinery (government etc.) [endquote] Why would that be a problem, when the same single-winner method is tending to elect the same kind of candidates, throughout Congress as in the presidency? As always, there might be regional differences in what kind of candidates are getting elected to Congress, but that's unavoidable. I also wonder how the minor party president and his single-party government would cooperate with the Senate and House of Representatives. [endquote] I wonder what you mean by "minor party". And why should the president, senate and HR be too different to co-operate? Remember, Congress would be elected by Approval too, and so they'd consist of the same "minor party" or set of similar parties. Necessarily, the president is just one person, and Congress is a set. That set averages out the differences. But that's a feature of the presidential system. The presidential system of government could be called the "One Lone Nut Theory of Government". I'd much rather have the parliamentary system. Elected in single-member districts by Approval, ICT, or other similarly good method. But, as I said, a big change like the change to parliamentary govt is entirely unattainable. So I'll settle for a good single-winner method in our presidential system. For president, and for Congress in single-member districts. And state legislatures in single-member districts. You continue: And would people be happy to give all the power of the president (including military) to a representative of a small minority for four years? [endquote] Under our constitution, the military isn't entirely under the president's power. And, above, your objection is really an objection to the presidential system, and is not an objection to Approval vs Plurality, or Approval vs Condorcet. As I said, the Presidential system is the One Lone Nut Theory of Government. I'd much rather have parliamentary government. But it isn't attainable here. You said: Maybe all that would work fine, or maybe not well enough. U.S. citizens to decide. [endquote] Maybe, with the influence of better government, due to Approval, and consequent more open education and a much more free and open media, maybe people will look around at Europe, and realize that we'd be better off with parliamentary government, that it would make more sense. Let's hope so. For now, let's just enact Approval. >I've showed a whole range of > numerical examples, from the 27,24,49 example to the 33,32,34 example. > I've told how the problem would come about, in Condorcet, just as well as in Approval. > Condorcet is not strategy-free, or anything close to it. You said: Yes. I don't see anyone denying the mathematical properties of the methods. But towards the end of my mail I said that I want to see if the methods are vulnerable also in practice. It is not sufficient to demonstrate that one person with full knowlege of the content of the actual votes and ability to change any of them could change the result. One good approach to demonstrate the practical vulnerability of a method would be to write some generic rules (or rules for some specific common situation) that voters or parties could use in real life elections to change the result. I have not seen any such good guidance that could be used to cheat Condorcet methods. [endquote] I don't consider offensive burial to be Condorcet's biggest problem, or even its 2nd biggest. But what you say above doesn't address my comments about many people's need to fully help the Democrat beat the Republican, and the examples for the C/D problem in Condorcet. > I believe that ICT > might actually come close to delivering on that promise. Condorcet does not. > I've abundantly told why. If you specifically disagree with something > I've said about that, then tell which statement you disagree with, and > why, and be specific. I hope I already answered that. Convincing practical guidance on how voters should vote in real life elections could do the job. I have seen some recommendations like "bury as much as you can", but I don't consider that very credible since often it doesn't make sense to bury, and this strategy may also make the results worse. A good startegy would be one that is likely to improve the results and can be implemented in real elections. I also assume that voters slightly prefer parties that want to play fair game. [endquote] In a C/D situation, people won't see noncooperation strategy as unfair, when it seems called for. And often you won't know if your defection is acting as offensive strategy, or as deterrent defensive strategy, because you don't know what the actual numbers are. You said: I'd take the risk. Anyway, I expect that Democrats and Republicans would not adopt Condorcet if their plan is to recommend all their supporters to bury the candidate(s) of the other major party. That would be too foolish. [endquote] Agreed. You continue: (They might however be happy with having some insignificant number of irrational burial srategists since those people in some sense help them making their worst competitors look bad.) So, the major parties would probably not recommend rampant burial. There's good hope that most voters would give up the idea of automatically burying the strongest competitors if the main parties agree that sincere voting gives better results (although they'll of course continue demonizing their strongest competitors verbally). I hope that there would be many experts and media telling people that Condorcet works just fine with sincere ranking. [endquote] Why would they tell people that? The Democrat and Republican parties, and the mass media that have always promoted them--why should they stop advising lesser-of-2-evils favorite-burial. "The only way to maximally help Dem beat Repub is to rank Dem alone in 1st place. Don't spoil it for Nader." You said: I have not heard of any strategy problems in the Condorcet elecions that have been held. Unfortunately we don't have yet any good examples from strongly competitive political Condorcet elections. [endquote] Thank you for explaining the observation that you reported. > Yes, Condorcet's strategy is far too > complicated to be known. But people will know that the Democrat can > only be maximally helped to beat the Republican by favorite-burial. That strategy ignors the fact that it may do more harm than good. [endquote] Of course. That goes without saying. It may be doing a lot more harm than good right now in our Plurality elections too. In fact it surely is. But so what? Compromise-obsessed voters will do everything it takes to maximally help Dem beat Repub. As I told Kristofer, favorite-burial is good, rational, optimal strategy in a u/a election when it seems that Compromise is the only acceptable who can beat the unacceptable. You asked: Did you assume rational or irrational voters here? It would not be a rational strategy to recommend all Democrats to bury all Republicans and vice versa. [endquote] I don't claim that they'll do that. Offensive burial isn't the main problem. My summary is that in order to prove that Condorcet methods will not work well enough in real life elections I'd like to see also demonstrations on how Condorcet methods can be cheated in practice. That could be done by giving rules that can be followed. For example: "If voter sees situation x, then he should modify his vote so that ..." or "If party sees situation y, then it should publicly recommend its supporters to modify their vote so that ...". When planning the strategies one must take into account that the polls are not exact and the opinions may change before the election day. [endquote] Uncertainly only magnifies the favorite-burier's need to favorite-bury. Or the defector's need to defect. Mike Ossipoff ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
