> It's necessary to distinguish between _two_ Condorcet disadvantages > that I spoke of: > > 1. Condorcet's FBC problem, when Condorcet is in use. > > 2. Condorcet's enactment problem, due to being a complicated > rank-balloting contraption. > > You addressed #1, but not #2.
We're going in circles [endquote] But I've acknowledged your points on those two matters. That wasn't going in circles. I agreed that maybe Condorcet could overcome its "complicated contraption" disadvantage locally, municipally, if no big outside opposition comes in, and if someone with Richie's money pushes it through. I agreed that that maybe Condorcet can overcome its "help-the-Democrat-against-the-Republican-as-much-as-possible" problem . For instance, I agree that in municipal Elections, parties aren't as important. Well, my only familiarity is with a city and county where parties aren't allowed in municipal elections. I don't know how much role parties have in other municipalities. But maybe, as you said, municipal elections will be free enough of the lesser-evil problem, so that voters will learn sincerity in Condorcet. I acknowledged those things some time ago. And then I said: But wouldn't it be better to not _have_ those disadvantages? Yes, I've already said that. You may have answered it. But it's undeniably better to not have a disadvantage. You asked, in this message, why IRV wasn't stopped by the "complicated contraption" argument, the argument that we don't know what it will do, and it needs more study. I already told you a theory: Money. As an illustration of what I mean by "It's better to not have a disadvantage", say Condorcet has a finite probability of getting enacted municipally somewhere. But what if Approval has many times greater probability of getting enacted municipally somewhere. You can propose Condorcet in a municipal jurisdiction if you want to, but just know that its probability of success will be a fraction of what Approval's success-probability would be. And then there's the possibility of state enactments, and even a national law or court ruling, based on the absurdity of Plurality's forced falsification. You said that slavery was first abolished in states, but my point was merely that no matter how traditional slavery was, it was still repealed because of its wrongness. Plurality's tradition can likewise be beaten by its wrongness. In a voting rights court ruling, for instance. There's obviously no chance of Condorcet being enacted by such a ruling. And that's the other thing about the municipal route. It's very slow. If Plurality's ridiculous wrongness can be shown, then there's a good chance of repealing, by court action, the requirement, in Plurality, that makes it so wrong: The forced falsification requirement. You continued: At this point you've said that Condorcet will get held up by people saying 'it is too complex, it needs more study'. Why? IRV didn't; and IRV is more complex than Condorcet. [endquote] Why? Because Plurality benefits some people, bigtime. If you benefited from the status quo, then you'd hire someone to argue against changing it. That's why. You ask "Why didn't IRV have that opposition". I answered that maybe it doesn't happen in every municipal campaign. Or maybe it didn't happen to IRV, but would happen to Condorcet, because Condorcet is better than IRV. Or maybe the promotional money made the difference in IRV's favor. Anyway, I'm not saying that it necessarily has to happen in every municipal enactment effort. But it's something that I've heard when suggesting a voting system reform to an elected representative. It's a sure thing that it will be said whenever something new is proposed. We aren't going in circles. I've agreed that Condorcet could overcome the disadvantages, but I've said that it would be better to not have disadvantages. The expected time to enact Approval is shorter than the expected time to enact Condorcet, due to the enactment disadvantage that Condorcet has. That alone is a big Advantage for Approval. Of course there's no reason that some people couldn't work for Condorcet while others are working for Approval. It's just that the ones working for Condorcet will probably take longer. Now--Are we off the circle? IRV's setbacks have, at least as far as I can see them, been primarily along two points: first, arguments that IRV is a trick, or is unamerican, or only Plurality is good enough for us (which also applies to Approval, see board posts [endquote] ...and I answered them. When people claimed that Approval would be worse, I pointed out that they couldn't give a reason to support their claim. I told of the simple difference with Approval, and I showed that there's no way that could be worse. That won't work with Condorcet, because it's far from obvious that that complicated contraption won't be worse than Plurality. I'm not saying that Condorcet might be worse than Plurality. I'm saying that you can't convince people that it won't be. A salesman comes to your door and shows you an expensive and complicated paint-spraying machine. Another salesman shows you a paintbrush. You can see the quality of brush bristles and handle-wood. You have to take the machine-salesman's word for it what's in his machine, and that it's reliable, that it won't go haywire or break down. You don't know the machine's quality. The brush will be reliable. You said: Compromising is a problem because Plurality compromise incentive is so obvious. [endquote] No, I told you about two conversations, and one observed Condorcet favorite-burial. I've experienced not one but two people who wanted to favorite-bury with new and better voting systems. I posted about that a week or so ago. I've talked to very few people on that subject. For those two to both have that problem, not just with Plurality, would be highly unlikely if it were something rare. It's as if astronomers found that the nearest star had planets, but didn't have the means to look farther. The fact that the one extrasolar star that they can observe has planets would strongly imply that planets aren't rare. You said: But, as I have said, even under Plurality, the voters sometimes say "forget about strategy", even on the national scale. Remember Ross Perot. [endquote] That's rare, and was only the result of Perot's money and consequent media support. And even then there was a tremendous lesser-of-2-evils problem for people who wanted to vote for Perot. You continue: I don't think the case is as clear cut as you say, either. Many other Americans on the list support Condorcet even though they know that it doesn't strictly meet FBC. [endquote] As you know, that's because they don't think FBC will be a problem for Condorcet. See above, where I told about my conversations with favorite-buriers, and my observation of some Condorcet favorite-burial. Maybe you're saying that polling reliably establishes which position is the correct one :-) There also are Americans who say IRV or VoteFair is the best public proposal. There are others who support Plurality, and argue against alternatives to it. I wouldn't make that up! Youl continued: If it was obvious that compromise incentive is the big thing to the extent that nothing short of FBC compliance could salvage a method, they would have held other positions. [endquote] Ah, wouldn't it be nice if what is correct is always obvious to everyone! :-) Think about that for a moment. There's be no need to debate anything. We'd have an ideal world. Look, some people think Condorcet won't have a problem. Maybe there are more of them. Maybe you think polling establishes correctness.\ Could it be that a majority was ever wrong about something? Maybe you think that you can reasonably say that, judging only by the advocacy numbers, the probability is greater that Condorcet doesn't have a problem. But you'd be forgetting that there are a number of Approvalists too, though they aren't active on EM right now. And there are also a number of RVists too All of these people question the Condorcet's belief in Condorcet's strategy-freeness. The most recent time, so far as I'm aware, that EM conducted a poll on voting systems, Approval won, by every method that we counted. Approval was the CW. Approval was the Approval winner. As I said, Approval won by every method that we did, including RV. > Yes, that's right. Without favorite-burial incentive, you can kiss-off > the media-fabricated two-party system. The Democrat and Republican > parties would be history. > Democrat and Republican politicians and party officials would have to > find other scams, other than politics. Maybe they can go into the > junkbond or S&L business, or something. > > We mustn't underestimate the degree that their electoral survival > depends on favorite-burial. Sure, and if you could find a method that passes IIA, you would eliminate every kind of strategic nomination incentive. But IIA is very strict, probably too strict. [endquote] If you're referring to IIAC, Arrow's Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives Criterion, then you _could_ find a method that meets IIAC. And, guess what: Someone _has_ found one. It's called Approval. Arrow's criteria and theorem really amount to a statement that rank methods have certain problems. Well, IIAC _will_ seem too strict if you're a Condorcetist :-) (Strong FBC is even more strict - you pretty much have only Approval and Antiplurality. I think someone wrote a paper about strong FBC earlier, and that there were some Bucklinesque and non-majoritarian methods that also passed it. However, you don't claim you need strong FBC, so that's a bit besides the point.) [endquote] Strong FBC would obviously be better. I've been using the weaker version, which I just call "FBC". But don't try to discount the desirability of Strong FBC. In any case, Approval meets both, and Condorcet meets neither. > Rank methods are complicated contraptions. People won't know that they > don't have unintended, unexpected consequences that could be > disastrous. Media pundits, commentators, tv anchormen, newspaper and > magazine editors and writers, talk-show hosts, and hired university > authorities will say, "You don't know what that voting system will do. > We can' change our voting system without being sure that the new one > won't be a disaster. This needs a lot more study." And then, of > course, it will never happen. And as you keep repeating that, I keep repeating: where were the "this needs a lot more study" calls for IRV? Why did IRV, chaotic and nonmonotone in its effects, not "never happen"? [endquote] I wasn't in the cities where IRV was enacted. In case you weren't aware of this, one all important factor is the ratio of the money available to the opponents, to the money available to the proponents. Richie was jetting around the country, to banquets, probably power lunche, and taking key people to dinner, etc. I'll bet that he could match the opponents' money. Forgive me if I repeat, when answering, again, a repeated question. And, as I've said every time you've asked that, maybe the full opposition isn't always present, for every municipal enactment campaign. If so, then maybe Condorcet can get lucky too. But, as I said, I wasn't there. Remember that, above, I said that, even if Condorcet could overcome (maybe) that disadvantage, the expected time until its enactment is necessarily greater than the expected time until Approval's enactment, due to the fact that Approval is the method that _doesn't_ have that problem. As you said, we've been over this. I've acknowledged that Condorcet might overcome its disadvantages. Maybe. Better to not have them. > That can't be said of Approval. Approval is the minimal fix of > Plurality's problem. Nothing other than the elimination of Plurality's > ridiculous forced-falsification requirement. I've told why it will be > obvious to all that that can only be an improvement. But will it last, or will you get a situation analogous to the 1800 tie between Jefferson and Burr? If the latter, couldn't that lead to backsliding? [endquote] Nonsense. It's worse in Plurality. A problem that's worse in Plurality won't make people want to go back to Plurality. In Plurality, if you help Compromise, you're, without any doubt, completely kissisng-off any chance of helping favorite _at all_, to any degree, against anyone. And before you say that Condorcet, too, has the chicken dilemma: first, it is not as obvious. Second, it requires more strategy on each side. [endquote] You wish. Wrong. Approval and Condorcet have that problem to the same degree. Same problem. Try Condorcet in the Approval bad-examples that I posted. The 27,24,49 example, and the 33,32,34 example. Or anything inbetween. Condorcet has the same problem. You continued: Third, despite how you keep repeating how "Condorcetists are in denial", there *are* Condorcet methods that handle the chicken dilemma. [endquote] The problem can be solved in Approval, by any of the 5 ways that I've described. It wouldn't surprise me if (using the necessary strategies) the problem couldn't be solved in Condorcet too. Condorcet still has the problem. Another thing that I said, to which you might be referring is that Smith-Top and Schartz-Top meet Condorcet's Criterion and are defection-resistant. Yes, but those aren't the Condorcet versions that are being advocated by most Condorcetists, are they. When you say Condorcet, you probably don't mean Smith-Top or Schwartz-Top. You continued: Really, I suppose what my intuition is going by at this point is: we have precedent that Approval has a very tense chicken dilemma situation, and that it has harmed Approval. [endquote] Maybe, to the extent that Condorcetists don't know that Condorcet has the same problem to the same degree. And I repeat that the problem can be dealt with. You continued: We don't have any precedent for a similar situation harming ranked ballot methods that have been tried. Where they have been reverted, it has not been because of chicken dilemma situations. [endquote] Maybe or maybe not. Maybe you're saying that though Condorcet has that problem too, it's easier to get distracted by the complexity, and to forget about the problem. I don't know. Neither you nor I know if that's happened with Condorcet or Approval. And no, co-operation/defection wouldn't cause people to go from Approval back to Plurality, because it's worse in Plurality. > Remember that Condorcet's winnability problem has nothing to do with > FBC. It's the "complicated contraption" problem that I spoke of > above--a problem that Approval, uniquely, doesn't have. And presumably a problem that IRV had, or Bucklin, or that even more complex thing used in New York, STV. Where were the "complicated contraption" voices then? [endquote] I've answered that several times about IRV. I wasn't there. Promotional money probably helped. Maybe that kind of opposition sometimes doesn't come to town. As for Bucklin and STV, those were more progressive days, electorally. People were more willing to experiment. Bucklin and STV were gotten rid of when they were found to be electing Communists and other socialists. Maybe too there were racial results that bothered some higher-ups. Anyway, whatever the reason was, that ended the days of free electoral experimentation. Those early 20th century days were quite progressive in some ways. The League of Nations almost adopted a reform calendar. Elizabeth Achellis's World Calendar would probably have been accepted if she'd been willing to drop the "blank days" that messed up the sequence of the days of the week, something that greatly put off some religions. She insisted on that because it's one way to get a "fixed calendar", a calendar that is the same every year. The religious organizations offered her another way to get a fixed calendar, by "leap-weeks" instead of leap days, but she wouldn't budge. Anyway, the League of Nations would probably have adopted her new calendar if she'd been a little more accommodating. Those days of free experimentation are over now. You continued: And where did the complicated contraption voices get top-two runoff disbanded? Limited voting? I don't think it's unique to Approval. [endquote] Limited voting was a product of that more progressive era. Top two runoff isn't complicated like Condorcet. > You continued: > > It [Approval] has the defection problem > > [endquote] > > So does Condorcet, to the same degree. So let's not use that to > compare those 2 methods--except that it's why I say that Condorcet > doesn't significantly improve on Approval. To the same degree? No. If voters just rank and don't strategically consider whether to defect or not, there's no problem [endquote] So there's no problem when there's no defection? :-) I've already said that Condorcet is fine when everyone ranks sincerely. And I'll say this again: Sure, if everyone ranks sincerely, in the Approval bad-examples, the CW wins if there is one. A wins. If A and B voters approve A and B in Approval, then they'll be close to a tie, or the winner among them will be decided by others. So, under sincere voting, Condorcet does great. But I never denied that. The problem is that there are strategy incentives. You continued: but in Approval, they can't "just Approve" without using implicit strategies outside of the method itself. Honest voters don't have to put any cutoff anywhere in a ranked method. They still have to put the cutoff somewhere in Approval. Sure, they can use strategies to guide where that cutoff has to be set, but they still have to set it. [endquote] You don't like for me to repeat things, but I've said this before too: Honest voters don't have to strategize in Approval. Vote for whom you like, trust, or consider deserving of your support. Forget about strategy. Yes, you can strategize if you want to. I've suggested some easy and simple strategies. You seem to be saying that Condorcet is better if everyone votes sincerely. You're hoping that they will. Dream on. And remember, if it's a u/a election, is it really so difficult to vote for all the acceptables and not for any of the unacceptable? I claim all of our elections are u/a. You continued: Let's be a little more formal about this. Consider left-right politics with voters and candidates on a line, voters preferring candidates closer to themselves. Now, let's assume some candidates are close enough and have a common base by enough that two of them have nearly the same amount of Approvals. To get the right winner in Approval, the voters have to fine-tune so that they don't get the other close candidate. [endquote] No, they don't. If you like them both, then approve them both. If you're talking about defection decisions, Condorcet's guaranteed CW-win under sincere voting won't help you. The same problem remains. If the other guy is the CW, you might take his win if you don't rank him. Just because he might he CW doesn't mean you don't prefer your own candidate winning. You continued: No big deal, maybe? But in Condorcet, the voters just rank all the candidates and everything works properly [endquote] ...if everyone ranks all the candidates :-) But, as I said, just because the rival might be CW doesn't mean you wouldn't rather elect your favorite instead. And I trust that you haven't forgotten about the favorite-burial incentive. The problems that I named are there. It's unrealistic to count on sincere voting in public political elections. If I, as do you, believed that everyone would vote sincerely in Condorcet, then I too would advocate Condorcet for public political elections. You continued: Or to put it in another way: Approval has a semi-honest/honest problem where Condorcet has none. When everybody are rational game theorists, then "Plain Condorcet" (i.e. not CT, Smith,Plurality, Smith,DAC or similar) is just as bad as Approval, true. But when the voters just want to get out there and vote... then it's not "to the same degree". It is not "to the same degree" when the fraction that votes honestly can shield against the effects of those that don't, either. [endquote] ...Sometimes they can't do so when voting sincerely. Ideally Condorcet does the right thing when everyone votes sincerely. No one's denying that. To be continued... Mike Ossipoff ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
