On 17.5.2012, at 4.39, Dave Ketchum wrote: > Oops - took so long stripping Mike O's zillion words that I forgot to respond. > > On May 16, 2012, at 10:05 AM, Dave Ketchum wrote: >> On May 15, 2012, at 2:55 PM, Juho Laatu wrote: >>> On 15.5.2012, at 11.11, Michael Ossipoff wrote: >>>> >>>> Juho and Kristofer: >>>> >>>> Just a few preliminary words before I continue my reply to Kristofer that I >>>> interrupted a few hours ago: >>>> >>>> We all agree that Approval would be much easier to propose and enact than >>>> would Condorcet. Therefore, we must also agree that, given the same level >>>> of >>>> effort, the expected time needed to enact Approval is quite a bit less than >>>> the expected time needed to enact Condorcet. >>>> >>>> Now, given that, there are two reasons why you could say that we should try >>>> for Condorcet instead of Approval: >>> >>> I'm still not quite certain what elections this proposal refers to. If it >>> refers to use of different single-winner methods in single-winner districts >>> of a multi-winner election to elect members to some representative body, >>> then I'm not ready to recommend elther of those changes before I understand >>> what the goals are. >>>> >>>> On another subject: >>> >>>> But if you want to suggest that others shouldn't propose Approval, then you >>>> need to give a good reason. >>> >>> Approval may be an easy and acceptaböe first step. My opinion is that you >>> should plan also next steps, in case someone wants to cancel the reform, >>> drive it further, or if the strategic vulnerabilities of Approval pop up in >>> some election (like the Condorcet criterion problem popped up in >>> Burlington, althogh that was maybe not even noticed by all). > > I know of no useful reason for rejecting Approval's replacement of Plurality > - it's permission to approve of more than one as equally desired while > rejecting less than Plurality and the increasing in complexity is trivial.
Use of Approval could be a good move although Approval itself is not problem free. And the political system might get some hickups. But there may well be more benefits than problems. And this is a practical place to start the reform. > > But stepping from Plurality or Approval to Condorcet is also doable and > worthy. Condorcet methods are good single-winner methods. Using them to elect representative bodies from single-member districs is an integersting non-classical approach. Approval and Condorcet are in the same category in the sense that they favour centrists and they move away from the alternating two-party power. Use of Condorcet avoids some of the problems of Approval. Juho > > This is a bigger change because it allows voting for unequally desired > candidates with unequal ranks, thus directing those preferred to be given > preference in winning. This preference allows voters to include less-liked > candidates while directing counters to consider better-liked candidates as > preferred. > > Note: Burlington, as displaying IRV's weakness, is not truly Condorcet, for > it has restrictions on ranking and its counters must make decisions without > considering all the content of the votes. > > DWK >> >>> Juho >>>> Now, to resume my Kristofer reply: >>>> Mike Ossipoff > > > ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
