2012/8/24 Michael Ossipoff <[email protected]> > I've printed the program out, and now I feel that I've probably found > and corrected all of its errors. > > This pseudocode is for counting Symmetrical ICT, a rank-count which, I > claim, avoids the strategy problems otherwise distort voters sincere > expression of preferences--does so better than any other rank-count. > > It meets FBC; is defection-resistant (maning that it avoids the > Chicken Dilemma);
In what sense does it avoid the chicken dilemma? If there are A(>B>C), B(>A>C), and C(>A=B) voters; and n(A)+n(B) > n(C) but n(C) > n(A) and n(C) > n(B); and it is not known whether n(A) > n(B); then how should an A voter vote so as to ensure that: ➊ If n(A) > n(B), then there is no strategy for the B voters to elect B ➋ If B voters vote in the symmetrically similar manner, and n(B) > n(A), then C is not elected. (That is to say, by ➊ and symmetry, B will be.) Jameson
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