On Sat, Aug 25, 2012 at 4:18 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm <[email protected]> wrote: > On 08/24/2012 04:56 PM, Michael Ossipoff wrote: >> >> I've printed the program out, and now I feel that I've probably found >> and corrected all of its errors. > > > Do you have any test vectors? Having tests would make it a lot easier to see > whether you have actually corrected all the errors.
If you mean have I run the program, no I haven't. As I was saying, the programming language that my computers have is the one that Microsoft Office includes: VBA. I haven't yet found out how to make a VBA program run. So I haven't run the program. However, I've looked it over thoroughly, and I'm confident that it now doesn't contain any errors. The fact that I assign values to Top(k,i), and then never use it isn't important. If I were to distribute the program again, I'd remove the statements about Top(k,i), but it doesn't matter. In fact, when I set Top(k,i) to 1, that emphasizes to the reader that I'm saying that the fact that candidate i is ranked 1 on that ballot is noted and pointed out, and will be used later (even if Top(k,i) won't be used). > In the case of an election method, those test vectors would be elections > where the method you're describing gives different results than as many > other methods as possible. You'd have expected input (the ballots) and > output (the winner or result ordering). > > Even better ones would also exercise edge case handling, like tiebreakers or > different parts of the logic of the method. > I've described a scenario in which unimproved Condorcet fails FBC. ICT and Symmetrical ICT never fail FBC. I've described a scenario, and given a simple example, in which unimproved Condorcet yields to defection, giving a Chicken Dilemma. It was the standard Approval bad-example. Later, I gave several versions of that example, with a wide range of different numbers. ICT and Symmetrical ICT are defection-resistant. They avoid the Chicken Dilemma, for the reason that I told to Jameson in my previous posting here at EM. I've listed a number of criteria, some of them of interest to many here, that ICT and Symmetrical ICT meet. To those, I'll add Plurality and Mono-Add-Top. Chris Benham, though very demanding about criterion compliances, is satisfied with the criterion compliances of ICT. Computer-counted test scenarios can only confirm the already-determined facts that I've stated. Are you desperately reaching, in an effort to save unimproved Condorcet from a comparison to ICT and Symmetrical ICT? With its FBC failure, unimproved Condorcet fails its comparison to Approval. You know, many voting-system-reform advocates are so used to unimproved Condorcet as the popular accepted standard, that they've come to live with and accept the flagrant perversity of FBC failure. Mike Ossipoff ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
