On 1.10.2012, at 19.16, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:

> On 10/01/2012 12:13 AM, Juho Laatu wrote:
>> On 30.9.2012, at 15.41, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
> 
>>> As far as intrinsically Condorcet methods go, Ranked Pairs feels
>>> simple to me. The only tricky part is the indirect nature of the
>>> "unless it contradicts what you already affirmed" step.
>> 
>> To me the biggest problem of path based methods is that there is no very
>> good real life explanation to why chains of pairwise victories are so
>> important. In real life the idea of not electiong a candidate that would
>> lose to someone who would lose to someone etc. doesn't sound like an
>> important criterion (since it doesn't talk about what the candidate is
>> like or how strong the opposition would be, but about what the set of
>> candidates and its network of relations looks like). Probably there will
>> never be a long chain of changes from one winner to another in real life.
> 
> I don't think you need to go into path logic for Ranked Pairs. Rather, how 
> about this?

Ranked Pairs is based on setting up a complete ranking where the result of one 
candidate may depend on pairwise comparisons of some distant candidates. If 
therere is a large top loop, changes in opinions between A and B may change the 
winner from C to D. In this sense some distant opinons along the paths 
somewhere may influence the "goodness" of a candidate.

> 
> "Because of the existence of cycles, it's obvious we need to discard some of 
> the data. So, what data do we discard?

I wouldn't say that we have to discard some data but that we may violate some 
pairwise preference opinions in the sense that the winner may lose some 
pairwise comparisons.

The reason why I don't like word "discard" is actually related to the fact that 
this makes us too easily think of the end result as a complete ordeing of the 
candidates, where some facts had to be discarded because they did not fit in 
the picture. And here the problem is that group opinions may indeed be cyclic, 
and there is no need to "correct" them to a transitive order. The used words 
are not that important. But whatever the words, I do stick to the claim that 
group opinions are graphs, not linear orders, and we must decide who the winner 
is, in the presence of cyclic opinions (not by eliminating them, at least not 
in all methods).

(Same comments about terms like "breaking cycles".)

> If we have to discard a one-on-one victory, lets discard those that are as 
> narrow, or involve as few voters, as possible.

Yes, it is in most cases better to violate some narrow victories rather than 
strong ones. (We can assume full rankings and skip the "few voters" criterion 
since it is not essential here and it would introduce new open questions.)

> Hence, we should go down the list of one-on-one contests and add the data 
> they give to our order unless it would produce a cycle. That way, all the 
> decisive contests get counted first and if we have to throw some away, it's 
> the weaker ones."

I can see two approaches here. One is to measure the preference relations of 
each candidate seprately, e.g. how much and to which other candidates someone 
loses and how this influences this candidate's "goodness". The other approach 
is that also the pairwise preferences of other unrelated candidates may 
influence the "goodness" of this candidate. One special case of this second 
approach is to say that the best winner should be picked so that the group 
oinion is first forced into a linear opinion using some criteria, and then the 
first candidate of that order is the winner. Minmax is an example in the first 
category where only the "personal properties" of each candidate do count.

> 
> It's a little IRVish (justifying the method by the way it works rather than 
> the outcome), but still...

I think the part that was "method oriented" was the formation of the linear 
ordering. The way Ranked Pairs arranges the candidates is however quite 
intuitive and natural (not as "heuristic" and "procedural" as IRV). But as 
already said, the intermediate result of a linear order of the candidates is 
not necessary, but just a method specfic trick.

Juho



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